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The preamble to the 1997 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand' claims that
the motivating purposes of the draft prepared by the Constituent Assembly which became
the body of the Constitution were:
promoting and protecting rights and liberties of the people, providing for public
participation in the governance and inspecting the exercise of State power as well
as improving a political structure to achieve more efficiency and stability .... 2
In other words, promotion and protection of individual rights, protections against
corruption, and stability of political institutions were the primary aims of the reform
movement which led to the 1997 Constitution.3 Such goals cannot be met without
institutional structures created and supported to enforce adherence to them. One of the
most important of these established by the 1997 Constitution4 is the Constitutional Court
of the Kingdom of Thailand.5
In discussing the need for research and academic comment on the Court,
Raksasataya and Klein explain that although the Court "is the key institution
1 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, enacted October 11h B.E. 2540 (1997) (Thai Const.), official
English translation, available on the website of the Constitutional Court of the Kingdom of Thailand at
http://www.concourt.or.thconcourt/eng/contents/Constitution%20of%2Othe%20Kingdom%20of%2OThaila
nd.pdf. An html version is available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/th00000 .html. Where possible,
citations will be to English translations in an effort to encourage comparative scholarship on this subject.
2 1997 Thai Const., preamble.
3 Accord, Amara Raksasataya and James R. Klein, eds., The Constitutional Court of Thailand: The
Working of the Court, Constitution for the People Society/The Asia Foundation (V.J. Printing, Bangkok
2003), p. i. While this book will be cited throughout this paper for the sake of continuity, it should be noted
that the book consists primarily of a brief explanatory work by the Constitutional Court's staff entitled "A
Basic Understanding of the Constitutional Court" which is also available on the Constitutional Court's
website at
http://www.concourt.or.th/concourt/eng/contents/A%20Basic%20Understanding%20of%2Othe%20Constit
utional%20Court.pdf and a paper by Klein entitled "The Battle for Rule of Law in Thailand: The
Constitutional court of Thailand," available on the Australian National University's website for its Centre
for Democratic Institutions at http://www.cdi.anu.edu.au/CDIwebsite 1998-
2004/thailand/thailand downloads/ThaiUpdate Klien ConCourt%20Apr03.pdf.
4 See, Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, secs. 255-270.
5 James R. Klein, "The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997: A Blueprint for Participatory
Democracy," Working Paper #8 in The Asia Foundation Working Paper Series (March 1998), available on
The Asia Foundation's website at http://www.asiafoundation.org/pdf/wp8.pdf ("The new Constitutional
Court is one of the most critical elements of Thailand's political reform process.")
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safeguarding the reforms of the 1997 Constitution," its functions and roles are not well
understood in Thai society. 6 It should be noted that they made this claim in 2003, when
the Court had been extant for over five years and after numerous authors had written
about the Court. 7 Although many writers have discussed the Court, most merely provide
a cursory overview of the Court in works covering the 1997 Constitution more broadly
without looking very far beyond the text of the specific section of the Constitution
dedicated to the Court.8 With one exception,9 those that did go into further depth
expounded on the Court's origins and functions without discussing what the Court has
done since its promulgation or how well its actions have addressed the purposes for its
creation.10 The only case which did receive significant media and press attention during
6 Raksasataya and Klein, eds., The Constitutional Court of Thailand, p. ii.
' See, e.g., Kramol Thongdhamachat and Cahwana Tramad, Wiwiatthanakan khong Rabop
Ratthathammanun Thai chak 'adit thung Patchuban (The Evolution of the Thai Constitutional Systems from
the Past to the Present), (Bangkok 2002), pp. 71-74 (summarizing very briefly the constitutional provisions
regarding the Court and offering some cursory insights); Pinai Nanakorn, "Re-making of the Constitution
in Thailand," Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law (2002), pp. 110-111 (giving a
cursory overview of the Court's precedent's shortcomings and how those were addressed in the 1997
Constitution); Photchananukrom Sap Kotmai Thai, 3d ed., Thai Royal Academy, (Bangkok 2001), pp. 316-
17 (providing a cursory overview of the Court and its functions); Sarawut Pratoomraj, Konkay Khumkhrong
Sitthi Manutsayachon: Tam Ratthathammanun haeng Ratcha'anachak Thai B.E. 2540 (Mechanisms for
the Protection of Human Rights: According to the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997),
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Bangkok 2001), pp. 5-15 (summarizing the Court's purposes and functions and
the means by which it can be utilized to protect individual rights); Gomez Khwanmuang, "Saan
Ratthathammanun (The Constitutional Court)," in Bunleud Khachayutthadech and Prayong Khongmuang,
eds., Ruam Sara: Ratthathammanun Chabap Prachachon (Collected Works: The People's Constitution),
(Bangkok 1998), pp.320-37 (discussing the Court's background, roles, composition, rules, procedures, and
jurisdiction and adding preliminary analyses on these topics, briefly mentioning a few of the Court's initial
decisions); Decho Sawananon, Naeothang Suksa Ratthathammanun haeng Ratcha'anachak Thai B. E.
2540 (An Approach to Studying the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997), (Bangkok 1998), pp.
254, 260-68 (providing an extremely brief overview of the courts, including the Constitutional Court, and
reproducing the relevant sections from the Constitution); Borwornsak Uwanno and Wayne D. Burns, "The
Thai Constitution of 1997: Sources and Processes," 32 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 227 (1998), p. 243; Klein,
"The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997," pp. 15-20 (addressing the precedents for the Court
and how the 1997 Constitution improves on those).
8 Most of the above-cited works are to this effect. Exceptions to this description would include the section
in Pratoomraj's booklet focusing on the Court and Khwanmuang's article.
9 Khwanmuang's article does discuss some of the Court's earliest cases, but it was published the year the
Court was established, so virtually no decisions were available.
10 See, e.g., Thongdhamachat and Traymad, Wiwiatthanakan khong Rabop Ratthathammanun Thai (The
Evolution of the Thai Constitutional Systems), pp. 71-74; Nanakorn, "Re-making of the Constitution in
Thailand," pp. 110-11; Klein, "The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997," pp. 15-20.
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this period was Thaksin's case, which received more than its share." Thus, at the time
Raksasataya and Klein published their work, including Klein's cogent though summary
analysis of the Court's jurisprudence through the October 10, 2002,12 there had been very
little scholarly work done on the workings and decisions of the Court.
Given this state of scholarship and academic commentary, particularly for those
limited to English-language sources, Raksasataya and Klein made the following
invitiation:
Central to addressing this problem is the need for a plethora of publications on the
Constitutional Court and its decisions that have been specifically prepared for a
variety of audiences and levels of complexity, as well as the academic research
such publications arise from. It is hoped that this publication contributes in some
small way to encouraging the study of the Constitutional Court of Thailand and an
enhanced appreciation of the critical role that the Court plays now, and will in the
future, in protecting the aspirations and interest of Thai citizens. 13
Unfortunately, research reveals this invitation has yet to find any takers. 4 While Klein's
work was very helpful, the Court has decided over 200 cases since the completion of his
work.15 What was true of Thai society's comprehension of the Court's institutional status
and functions when Raksasataya and Klein wrote, unfortunately, remains true today and
is not only true of Thai society but of those who study its political and legal institutions,
" Decision No. 20/2544 (2001). The newspaper articles related to this case are too numerous to document
here. Two political science works discussing the case, though from the perspective of Thaksin rather than
that of the Court, are Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand, (NIAS
Press 2005) and Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand,
(Chiang Mai 2004). This case will be discussed in its jurisprudential context below.
1 Raksasataya and Klein, eds., The Constitutional Court of Thailand, p. 40.
13 Raksasataya and Klein, eds., The Constitutional Court of Thailand, p. ii.
14 Indeed, when the research for this paper was in its early stages, Dr. Klein was contacted via email to find
out what further research, given that he had already addressed the topic, needed to be done. He noted that
his own work only covered the Court's adjudication through the end of 2002 and that significant
developments had taken place since then which bore heavily on the question of whether the Court was
fulfilling its intended functions. (email correspondence 1/26/06).
15 See, summary of the Court's decisions available on its website at
http://www.concourt.or.th/concourt/en index.jsp.
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many of whose writings are indicative of an underestimation of its role. 16 Those whose
writing does not indicate a misunderstanding nevertheless add little to the academic
discussion, generally focusing on other aspects of the Constitutional Reforms.'7 While
the writings about constitutional reforms and political institutions in Thailand
demonstrate a recognition, limited though it may be, of the importance of the
Constitutional Court in theory, very little has been written about what it has done in
practice.18 More work is required to understand and assess the Court's performance as
judged by the roles it was intended to play and those which it should play in the future.
This paper represents an effort to begin to address this gap in the academic
literature. Section II discusses the origins, background, and functional and institutional
precedents of the Constitutional Court. Section III will then address the roles and
functions of the Court as stated in the Constitution and explained by commentators.
While these first two topics have been addressed by other writers, they are necessary to
lay the foundational understanding required to make the data and analysis regarding the
Court's jurisprudence since its inception presented in Section IV comprehensible and to
assess the degree to which the Court has fulfilled its envisioned functions and roles, the
topic of Section V. Thus, this project is not intended to provide a full history of the Court,
or even a comprehensive but brief history of the Court. Rather, it is intended as a sort of
brush clearing to lay the foundations and point directions for further work on the Thai
16 See, e.g., McCargo and Pathmanand, Thaksinization, pp. 15-17 (underemphasizing role of the Court);
Pasuk and Baker, Thaksin, p. 176 (claiming the Court is under Thaksin's control).
17 See, e.g., Andrew Harding, "Thailand's Reforms: Human Rights and the National Commission," Journal
of Comparative Law (Wildy Simmonds, & Hill 2006), The Journal of Comparative Law, p. 96, available at
http://www.wildy.co.uk/jcl/pdfs/harding.pdf?PHPSESSID= 161423dee6e6e408 lb3 Iadd9eO7ed4O5.
18 Khwanmuang's article and Klein's work in Raksasataya and Klein, eds., The Constitutional Court of
Thailand, in addition to the attention given to Decision 20/2544 (Thaksin's case) represent the significant
exceptions to this claim. However, as discussed above, these are insufficient to serve as a basis for
assessing the Court's performance against the roles it was intended to have at its inception, despite the
quality of Klein's work, as even he has stated the need for further scholarship on this topic.
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Constitutional Court, its roles, its decisions, and work comparing it with similar
institutions in other countries.
II. Historical Sources
"Prior to promulgation of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (1997),
Thailand had never had a tradition nor legal precedent for an independent agency to rule
on political and legal issues." 19 While Klein's assertion regarding the lack of precedent
for the Constitutional Court is correct in the limited sense in which it is intended, it
cannot be taken to mean the Court is without precedent of any sort. That is to say that the
Court is an innovative institution in that, prior to its establishment, there had never been
one institution entrusted with the same responsibilities and empowered in the same way
as the Court is. While true, this does not mean that the roots of its powers and functions
are nonexistent in the system of governance. The predecessors to some of the Courts
powers and functions can be traced back to 1946.20
A. Thai Supreme Court's (Saan Dika) Decision No. 1/2489
Thailand had allied itself with Japan in World War II but sought to avoid any
negative repercussions from its acquiescence to Japan's military might and demands
through diplomatic means in a post-war foreign policy designed to curry Western favor.
One means for doing so was through the enactment of legislation criminalizing certain
acts which had been perpetrated by Thais in furtherance of the alliance with Japan
through the War Criminal Act of 1945 (Phraratchabanyat Achayagon Songkhram, B.E.
2488). Pursuant to this Act, war-time Prime Minister Field Marshal Plaek
19 Raksasataya and Klein, eds., The Constitutional Court of Thailand, p. 35.
20 As Klein does himself in "The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997," p.1 7 -1 8 .
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Phibunsongkhram was prosecuted for some of his actions during the war.21 Ultimately,
the Supreme Court saved him from the firing squad,22 but more important for present
purposes is how it did so.
In finding for Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram, the Supreme Court interpreted
and applied the Section 14 of the Constitution providing for bodily liberty to mean
freedom to act within the bounds of the law in force at the time of action.23 The Court
reasoned that because the War Criminal Act, as applied in this case, would punish for
acts which were lawful at the time they were committed, that portion of the Act as
applied in this case was unconstitutional and thus void.24
To modern readers, this appears to be a sensible and relatively uninteresting
application of the doctrine of judicial review. What makes this case important for the
purposes of this paper and in the development of the Constitutional Court is that no Thai
court had ever claimed such power. Moreover, the Supreme Court had asserted this
power in spite of a constitutional provision purporting to vest Parliament with the
exclusive right to interpret the Constitution.2 The Supreme Court overcame this hurdle
by citing the constitutional provision empowering the courts to decide cases at law and
reasoning the power to interpret was implicit in such a mandate. 26 By so doing, the
Supreme Court established the power of judicial review in the Thai system of governance,
demonstrating that the Constitution could override Parliamentary Acts. However, it still
lacked the institutional capacity of a constitutional court in that it was not clear when
21 See, Khamphiphagsa Khadi Achayagam Songkhram (War Crimes Act Case), Decision No. 1/2489,
Supreme Court of Thailand, in Nawicharoen Bannathigan, Khamphiphagsa Dika B.E. 2489 (Supreme
Court Judgments, 1946), (Bangkok 1946), pp. 624-45.22 Ibid., p. 633; see also Klein, "The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997," p.1 7 .
23 Decision No. 1/2489, p. 624.
24 Ibid., p. 633.
25 Ibid., p. 629, citing Section 62 of the Constitution.
26 Ibid., p. 629, citing Section 58 of the Constitution.
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parties could raise constitutional claims or if all provisions of the Constitution could give
rise to such claims. Moreover, the Supreme Court served as little, if any, check on the
legislature, as can be seen by the legislature's actions described in the following section.
B. The Constitutional Tribunal
In reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in the War Criminals Act Case, "the
drafters of the 1946 Constitution created the Judicial Committee for the constitution with
absolute powers of judicial review." 27 Klein continued to explain that, under this system,
"if a court considered a law to be unconstitutional, it could reserve judgement and submit
an opinion to the Judicial Committee for a ruling." 28 Essentially, the legislature acted to
prevent the Supreme Court from continuing to broaden its power to interpret the
Constitution by removing such considerations from the Supreme Court's province and
assigning them to the Judicial Committee. What Klein refers to as a Judicial Committee
was replaced in 1949 with the Constitutional Tribunal (Khana Tulakan
Ratthathammanun) 29 and was almost uniformly30 constitutionally provided for in one
form or another from 1946 until it was replaced by the Constitutional Court in 1997.1
While the Constitutional Tribunal's powers and independence varied to a certain
degree under the various Thai constitutions, 32 it generally lacked the power to enforce its
27 Klein, "The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997," p.1 8, citing Somyos Chuathai,
"Khamathibai Lak Rattathammanun Thuabai (Explanation of General Constitutional Principles),"
(Bangkok 1992), pp. 59-60 and Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1946, secs. 87-89.
28Ibd
29 Klein, "The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997," p. 43 n. 17.
30 Ibid., n. 16 (explaining that "the short-lived 1951 and 1957 constitutions are an exception" but a qualified
one in that both "constitutions were used during periods" of military rule). Apparently discounting these
two exceptions, Khwanmuang asserts that all seven versions of the constitution from 1946 through 1991
contained provisions regarding a Constitutional Tribunal. "Saan Ratthathammanun (The Constitutional
Court)," p. 321.
31 Klein, "The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997," p.1 8.
32 See, Klein, "The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997," p.1 8 and 44 n. 18; see also
Khwanmuang, "Saan Ratthathammanun (The Constitutional Court)," p. 321 (summarizing the differences
in the provisions regarding the Constitutional Tribunal in the various constitutions).
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judgments and completely lacked independence from the political system.33 Another
important shortcoming of the Constitutional Tribunal, at least until the version created by
the 1991 Constitution, was that the ultimate power to interpret the Constitution resided
not in the Constitutional Tribunal but in Parliament.34 While this particular shortcoming
was overcome through Article 207 of the 1991 Constitution in which "the right of
interpretation was granted to the Constitutional Tribunal," 35 its other shortcomings
remained. Indeed Thongdhamachat claims it was more properly conceived of as a
political institution rather than a court. 36 This claim finds support in the text of Chapter
X of the 1991 Constitution, entitled "The Constitutional Tribunal".37
To begin, that the Tribunal was given its own chapter in the Constitution rather
than being included in the section relating to courts, 38 indicating an understanding of its
institutional character as clearly different from a court. The most striking feature of the
Constitutional Tribunal under the 1991 Constitution becomes clear from the provisions
regarding the Tribunal's composition. First, it was presided over by a political figure, the
President of the National Assembly, rather than a judge.39 Another politician, the
President of the Senate, was to serve on the Tribunal along with the President of the
Supreme Court, the Attorney General (which is arguably a political position), and six
experts, half of which were to be appointed from the field of law with the other half to
3 Ibid.
34 Klein, "The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997," p.1 8, citing the 1946 Thai Const., sec. 86.
3 Klein, "The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997," p.1 8.
36 Thongdhamachat, Wiwiatthanakan khong Rabop Ratthathammanun Thai (The Evolution of the Thai
Constitutional Systems), pp. 71.
37 1991 Thai Const., ch. X, available online at http://www.parliament.go.th/files/library/Iawl0e.htm. On
the institutional shortcomings of the Constitutional Tribunal, particularly looking to the version under the
1991 Constitution, see Thongdhamachat, Wiwiatthanakan khong Rabop Ratthathammanun Thai (The
Evolution of the Thai Constitutional Systems), pp. 71; Nanakorn, "Re-making of the Constitution in
Thailand," p. 110; Khwanmuang, , "Saan Ratthathammanun (The Constitutional Court)," p. 322-23.
38 See, 1991 Thai Const., ch. VIII (Courts) and ch. X (Constitutional Tribunal).
39 1991 Thai Const., ch. X, sec. 200.
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have backgrounds in political science. 40 These six appointments were made by the House
of Representatives and the Senate. 41 This group of experts served for only four years but
could be reappointed. 42 "Obviously, the discharge of [the Tribunal's] duty could be
influenced by the person having the power to recommend re-appointment." 4 3 With the
exception of the President of the Supreme Court, the same could be said of the remaining
members of the Tribunal.
These provisions make clear that the Tribunal, throughout its history, was not
intended to be independent from the political process. Moreover, it was apparently never
intended (or at least not enabled) to play a large role. "Its lack of importance was
highlighted by the fact that its members were not even full-time Tribunal members."44
Surely, appointing people to the Tribunal who already hold jobs such as presiding over
the National Assembly, Senate, and Supreme Court is an indication that the appointment
was not anticipated to require much time or effort. The historical record accords with
such an understanding - from 1946 until 1991, the Tribunal handed down a mere 13
decisions. 45
III. Expected Role
While the focus of this paper is the Thai Constitutional Court, at least an
introductory understanding of the reform movement which led up to the 1997
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 1991 Thai Const., ch. X, sec. 202.
43 Nanakorn, "Re-making of the Constitution in Thailand," p. 110.
44 Klein, "The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997," p.19.
45 Khwanmuang, , "Saan Ratthathammanun (The Constitutional Court)," p. 322. Khwanmuang does not
cite his source for this information, and I have been unable to discover any information regarding the
Constitutional Tribunal for the period 1991-1997. However, given the large degree of similarity between
the 1991 Constitutional Tribunal and previous versions, it seems likely there was not a large increase in
activity. Alternatively, it might be the case that an increase in such activity made the need for a
Constitutional Court more obvious, helping pave the way for its establishment. Without available data,
there cannot be a definitive answer.
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Constitution and the Court's establishment is essential to an analysis of the Court's origin,
its functions, and its character. "Its establishment is part and parcel of the current process
of political reform in which the basic rights and freedoms of the Thai people are
enhanced and clearly guaranteed in the Constitution." 46 As noted in the introduction, the
driving forces behind this reform movement were threefold: promote and protect rights,
encourage popular participation in government, and to increase and ensure the
transparency, stability, and efficiency of governmental organs.
The discussion in Section II demonstrates that the powers and institutions
available at the time of this reform movement were incapable of contributing towards
these ends in a significant way, let alone truly safeguarding them. The Supreme Court,
although arguably sufficiently reputable to garner the kind of deference necessary to
achieve these goals, lacked essential institutional requirements. It lacked the breadth of
jurisdiction required to address numerous constitutional issues, such as division of
powers, unless they were somehow related to a case over which it had jurisdiction.
Moreover, Parliament had made clear its desire that the interpretation of the Constitution
(and, thus, its enforcement) was not to fall within the province of the courts but of the
Constitutional Tribunal in constitutions from 1946 onward, as discussed above. Under
Section 206 of the 1991 Constitution, the courts were required to submit such questions
to the Constitutional Tribunal, 47 removing this function from the powers of the courts.
On the other hand, the Constitutional Tribunal lacked the independence, reputation,
resources, and will to carry out these functions. In short, there existed no institution in
1997 in Thailand with the requisite independence and power to ensure the achievement of
4 Raksasataya and Klein, eds., The Constitutional Court of Thailand, p. 3.
47 1991 Thai Const., ch. X, sec. 206.
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the goals of the 1997 reform movement. Therefore, the framers of the 1997 Constitution
were left with no alternative but the creation of a new institution, or new institutions,
entrusted with achieving and ensuring these aims.
One might wonder why the Constitutional Drafting Assembly (CDA) decided to
create a Constitutional Court and grant it such broad powers. This concern is difficult to
address if one assumes the legislature wielded a great deal of influence over the CDA.
However, only twenty-three of the CDA's ninety-nine members were appointed by the
Parliament, while the remaining seventy-six were drawn from the provinces, one from
each.48 Although Parliament's final approval was required, its refusal could have been
overridden by a simple majority in a public referendum. 49 Additionally, as stated above,
the 1991 Constitution had already moved in this direction. Indeed, in the CDA, the
establishment of the Constitutional Court and its powers was most opposed by the
judiciary which wished to keep or consolidate power within the then extant framework. 50
This dissonance led to important concessions discussed by Klein51 but not addressed in-
depth here.
A. Establishment
Pursuant to the 1997 Constitution,52 the Constitutional Court of the Kingdom of
Thailand was established "by Royal Command, dated 11 April, B.E. 2541 (1998)"53 and
handed down its first decision in May of that year.54 While giving it the title "Court" and
the including in the chapter of the Constitution dedicated to the courts, in and of
48 Uwanno and Burns, "The Thai Constitution of 1997," p. 240.
49 RnCla
5S Raksasataya and Klein, The Constitutional Court of Thailand, p. 36.
51 See, Raksasataya and Klein, The Constitutional Court of Thailand, pp. 36-37.
52 Thai Const., ch. VII, pt. II, secs. 255-270.
5 Raksasataya and Klein, The Constitutional Court of Thailand, p. 3.
54 See, Decision No. 1/2541.
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themselves, demonstrate a significant change in the way this body was perceived, these
are insufficient to provide this institution with the requisites for achieving the roles
contemplated for it in the overall reshaping of governance. Courts do not, indeed cannot,
enforce compliance with their judgments. Instead, they rely on the parties' perception of
their legitimacy and adherence to principles to which individuals and entities feel bound
to submit in order to ensure compliance with their decisions. Thus, the appearance of
both independence and power or authority is vital to a court's utility. As demonstrated by
the text of the Constitution and the analyses of commentators, the 1997 Constitution
makes significant progress in providing the Court with these necessary elements.
1. Composition
The Court is made up of a total of fifteen judges who are to come from the
Supreme Court (five judges, elected at a general meeting of the Supreme Court),55 the
Supreme Administrative Court (two judges, elected at a general meeting of the Supreme
Administrative Court),56 five experts from the field of law,57 and three experts from the
field of political science. 58 These are. "to be appointed by the King upon advice of the
Senate... ."59 Once elected, the judges are to hold a meeting and elect one of their
number to serve as President of the Constitutional Court.60 The Court prescribes its own
procedure which must adhere to certain "fundamental guarantees" of fairness. 61 The
55 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 255(1).
56 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 255(2).
5 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 255(3).
58 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 255(4).
59 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 255.
60 Ibid.
61 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 269. For a current version of the Court's rules, see Amara Raksasataya,




judges are appointed for a term of nine years and are prohibited from re-appointment. 62
One's term may be shortened by death, resignation, reaching 70 years of age, committing
a prohibited act, or through removal. 63
Comparing the Thai Constitutional Court with other constitutional courts or with
other bodies to which it bears significant similarity, such as the International Court of
Justice (ICJ), is an interesting topic for further research. For example, the Constitutional
Court and the ICJ are similar in numerous respects. Like the Constitutional Court, the
ICJ has 15 members64 who each serve nine-year terms. 65 Moreover, the members of the
ICJ come from similarly diverse backgrounds - some with academic backgrounds and
others with legal or judiciary experience. 66 Lastly, the ICJ and the Thai Constitutional
Court are both somewhat hybrids in that they do not follow either a purely-common law
or a purely civil law tradition. This tension in the ICJ is created by the deliberate lack of
guidance in its statute in this respect combined with the differing backgrounds of its
members where, in the Thai context, it comes from the precedential weight given to its
decisions 67 despite its place in a civil law tradition.68
2. Qualifications
The qualifications for the judges vary drastically depending on their background
(i.e., whether they come from other courts or from a field of expertise). The only
62 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 259.
63 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 260.
6 Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Stat.), art. 3(1); available online at http://www.ici-
cij.org/icwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm#CHAPTER I.
65 ICJ Stat., art. 13(1).
66 Biographies of the current members of the ICJ are available on the Court's website at http://www.ici-
cii.org/iciwww/igeneralinformation/igncompos.html.
67 See, Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 264 (requiring submission of constitutional issues to the
Constitutional Court only where such issues have not yet been decided by it).
68 See, Judge Peter J. Messitte, "Common Law v. Civil Law Systems," available on the US State
Department's website at http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itdhr/0999/ijde/messitte.htm (explaining the
differences between the two systems, particularly discussing civil law's emphasis on code law and common
law's allowance for judge-made law in the form of precedent).
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qualification applicable to those coming from other courts is that they be elected in a
general meeting of their court. 69 It might be thought that this would be sufficient since,
presumably, these judges would already have met the qualifications required for their
appointing courts. However, no such constitutional provisions exist, and those extant
under the Regulation of the Judicial Service Act are less stringent than those required of
non-judge appointees to the Constitutional Court.70 These requirements simply do not
speak to political neutrality. Judges to come from the fields of law and political science,
on the other hand, have to meet several qualifications unrelated to their expertise. These
include being of Thai nationality,71 being at least forty-five years of age,72 not being a
69 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 255(1) and (2).
70 See, Charunun Sathitsuksomboon, "Thailand's Legal System: Requirements, Practice, and Ethical
Conduct," Tilleke & Gibbins International Ltd., September 2001, p. 5, available online at
http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:KqClFuRhddOJ:www.tillekeandgibbins.com/publications/pdf/thailand
legal system.pdf+qualifications+judges+thai+court&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=3, citing Section 26 of
the Regulation of the Judicial Service Act B.E. 2543 (AD 2000). According to this law, to sit for the
examination required to become a judge, one must
(a) hold[] Thai nationality
(b) be not less than 25 years of age
(c) uphold[] the democratic regime according to the Constitution with good faith
(d) be an ordinary member of the Thai Bar Association
(e) not hav[e] ignominious or immoral conduct
(f) not be[] insolvent
(g) not be[] under suspension or hav[e] temporarily resigned pursuant to the Regulation of the
Judicial Service Act or other laws
(h) not hav[e] been expelled, dismissed or removed from official service, any state agency or
state enterprise
(i) not be[] imprisoned by a final judgement, except for an offence committed through
negligence or as a result of a petty offense
() not be[] incompetent or a quasi-incompetent person, or a person of unsound mind or mental
disorder or having a body or mental condition inappropriate for being a judge, or having a
disease, as prescribed by the Regulation of the Judicial Service Commission
(k) hav[e] passed physical and mental examinations by a committee of doctors, consisting of not
less than three; the report of such committee shall be approved by the Judicial Service
Commission.
Research revealed no indications of Supreme Court or Administrative Court judges being required to meet
higher or more stringent qualifications than those generally applicable to all judges.
71 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 256(1).
72 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 256(2).
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Buddhist priest, novice, monk or clergyman, 73 as well as several aimed at ensuring the
political neutrality of the those to be elected, 74 among others. 75
3. Prohibitions
While the qualifications differ depending on from what group the judge comes,
the prohibitions on his/her conduct are uniform in application. Judges may not be a
government official in a position which is permanent or which provides a salary.76 They
are also prohibited from being an official or an employee of a state agency or enterprise. 7 7
Further, the judges may not hold any position in a for-profit company or business or
engage in any independent profession.78 Should it become known that a judge did not
cease to engage in any such activities within fifteen days of his or her election, "it shall
be deemed that that person has never been elected . . . ."79 Engaging in any of these acts
once one has joined the Court is grounds for immediate vacation from office. 80
B. Powers
The Court's powers and functions under the Constitution have been described in
numerous and varying ways. Uwanno and Burns explained the Court was "empowered
to deal with all laws challenged as unconstitutional and to decide issues involving
73 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 256(4), cf. Thai Const., ch. VI, pt. II, sec. 106(2).
74 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 256(5) ("not being a member of the House of Representatives, senator,
political official, member of a local assembly or local administrator"); 256(6) ("not being or having been,
in the past, a member or holder of other position of a political party over the period of three years preceding
the taking of office"); 256(7) (not being an Election Commissioner, an Ombudsman, a member of the
National Human Rights Commission, a judge of an Administrative Court, a member of the National
Counter Corruption Commission or a member of the State Audit Commission").
7 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 256(4), cf. Thai Const., ch. VI, pt. II, secs. 106 and 109.
76 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 25 (1).
77 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 258(2).
78 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 258(3)-(4).
79 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 258.
80 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 260(5).
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overlapping authority."81 The authors of the introduction to the Court on the Court's
website are more precise:
The Constitutional Court is entrusted with the responsibility of ruling on the
constitutionality of organic laws, laws, regulations, draft laws and regulations,
resolutions made by political parties, status of members of the House of
Representatives and the Senate, actions of governmental organizations which may
infringe upon the basic rights and freedoms of the people, legal cases referred to it
by the Courts ... , status of Cabinet members and members of the Election
Commission, conflicting jurisdiction of different constitutional bodies and
questions referred to it by the National Counter Corruption Commission and the
Ombudsmen etc.82
While accurate, this description is somewhat lacking if elucidation is desired. Thus, the
Court's powers and functions under the Constitution are described below.8 3 The
classifications are offered as a means of organizing the Court's numerous functions in a
way that is easier to understand. As delineated, there is some overlap between the
groupings of powers as some functions can be accurately classified into more than one
group. It is also vital to note at this point that Section 268 requires the Court's decisions
"be deemed final and binding on the National Assembly, Council of Ministers, Courts
and other State organs." 84 Therefore, the powers exercised by the Court are to be
supported, given effect, and not derogated by these bodies.
1. Judicial Review
One of the most important tasks the Court is to perform involves the
determination of "the constitutionality of parliamentary acts," including "both the text of
81 Uwanno and Burns, "The Thai Constitution of 1997," p. 243.
82 In Raksasataya and Klein, The Constitutional Court of Thailand, p. 4.
83 The chart found in Raksasataya and Klein, The Constitutional Court of Thailand, pp. 29-32 was
consulted and referred to for this section, though several additions and changes were necessary, given that
the chart omitted important jurisdictional sections, such as Section 192 (or, more properly, organic law
made pursuant to this section) and Section 328.
8 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 268.
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the legislation passed as well as the process the legislators followed.",85 This
responsibility overlaps to a great extent with the enforcement of individual rights
embodied in the Constitution, since such acts may be challenged by individuals as
contravening the Constitution under Section 264 or by the Ombudsman, as discussed
below. 86 Section 262 provides a way for the Court to pass on the constitutionality of laws
that have been approved or reaffirmed by the National Assembly. 87 While this process is
essentially the same as that set out for advisory opinions in many jurisdictions, the word
"advisory" is a bit of a misnomer in this context since a determination that a bill or
organic law or a part thereof is contrary to the Constitution by the Court mandates the
lapsing of that bill, law, or part thereof.88 The Court's responsibility in this area, as with
each of the functions discussed, may be expanded as provided for in organic laws made
pursuant to Section 192.89
2. Constitutional Institutions and Functioning
The Court functions as both an arbiter between constitutional bodies and an
overseer of them. That is to say that the Court has the power to determine questions
arising "as to the powers and duties of organs under the Constitution" where such organs
or the President of the National Assembly submit the matter to the Court.90 Where such a
dispute exists, Section 266 mandates ("shall submit") submission to the Court but
85 Raksasataya and Klein, The Constitutional Court of Thailand, p. 42.
86 See, Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 264; see also Pratoomraj, Konkay Khumkhrong Sitthi
Manutsayachon (Mechanisms for the Protection of Human Rights), p. 11-13 (describing how Section 264
can be used to enforce individual rights).
87 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 262.
88 Ibid. While the binding nature of advisory opinions is not necessarily out of the ordinary for jurisdictions
which have this feature, the term is, nevertheless, something of a misnomer, even if a uniformly used one.
89 See, Thai Const., ch. VI, pt. V, sec. 192. An example of such expansion is the Court's jurisdiction to
hear cases regarding the dissolution of political parties pursuant to Organic Law of the Political Party Act,
art. 65(2) (cf. Thai Const., ch. XIII, sec. 328).
90 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 266. Such organs include the National Counter Corruption Commission,
the Election Commission, the Senate, the House, etc.
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provides no procedure for establishing a dispute where neither party makes a submission.
This could mean that when faced with actual disputes between such organs, if both (or all,
if the dispute is multilateral) sides wish to avoid Court proceedings, the dispute could be
settled through other means or not settled at all in contravention of the Constitution.
Thus, although either side can submit a case and opinion for consideration under Section
266, there remains a gap between the constitutional mandate and the Court's powers.
This is because the Court is supposed hear all disputes between constitutional organs but
is reliant on those organs to submit the dispute in the first instance. Should this prove to
be problematic in practice, the provision could be amended to allow the Court to begin
such a case on its own motion and require submissions from both sides pursuant to its
broad fact-finding powers under Section 265.91
The Court has numerous roles in the oversight of various constitutional organs in
the performance of their responsibilities. One way the Court oversees or checks the
Election Commission is by adjudicating challenges to the qualifications or activities of
Election Commissioners under Section 142.92 Additionally, it was to adjudicate on the
constitutionality of regulations prescribed by the Election Commission where the
Commission had determined the law concerning the election of members of the House
was unconstitutional and had replaced it with regulations of its own, prior to the
promulgation of the organic law bills on elections made pursuant to Section 323.93 The
last, and probably most important, function of oversight the Court performs with regard
91 See, Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 265.
92 Thai Const., ch. VI, pt. IV, sec. 142.
93 Thai Const., ch. XIII, sec. 324.
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to the Election Commission is to evaluate the Commission's decisions to dissolve parties
for non-compliance with Section 328.94
Apart from passing on the constitutionality of the laws it passes, the Court
oversees the activities of the National Assembly in at least three ways. The first is by
ensuring non-involvement of members of the House, Senate, or committees in the use of
appropriations as required by Section 180(6) in accordance with Section 180(7).95 The
second way it acts as overseer of the National Assembly is by passing on the
constitutionality of the draft rules of procedure of the House of Representatives, the
Senate, and the National Assembly, similar to its power under Section 262 relating to
bills, via Section 263.96 Third, when a bill or organic law bill is being withheld pursuant
to Section 175,97 the Council of Ministers and members of the House of Representatives
are prohibited from introducing "a bill or an organic law bill having the same or similar
principle as that" being withheld. 98 Where the House or the Senate believes the
prohibited conduct has occurred, the President of the House or the President of the Senate
shall submit the case to the Court for determination.99 Where the Court determines the
newly introduced bill or organic law bill does have the same or similar principle as that
being withheld, such bill shall lapse.100
Lastly, the Court exercises its power to oversee the functioning of the National
Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) in two ways. First, the Court was empowered
to review the constitutionality of NCCC's provisional regulations which it was to pass
94 This power was granted to the Court via the Organic Law of the Political Party Act, art. 65(2) (see, e.g.,
Decision No. 6/2541).
95 Thai Const., ch. VI, pt. V, sec. 180(6)-(7).
96 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 263.
97 Thai Const., ch. VI, pt. V, sec. 175.





and which were to remain in force until the organic law on counter corruption came into
force. 101 Of more lasting significance, the NCCC is required to refer all cases where it
has found a failure to comply with the procedures for submission of accounts mandated
in Section 292 to the Court for final decision.' 02 Second, the Court oversees the
functioning of National Assembly is by passing on conformity constitutionally-mandated
procedure103 and regulations for Emergency Decrees.104
In addition to its functions directly related to oversight of the National Assembly
and its workings, the Court is empowered to exercise authority to uphold the Constitution
as it relates to political parties. Political parties' resolutions may be submitted to the
Court by party members of the House for determination of the resolutions'
constitutionality.105 The Court also has jurisdiction to hear submissions referred by the
president of either the House or Senate regarding the alleged termination of membership
of members of either house106 or the alleged termination of the ministership of a member
of the Council of Ministers.107 In a similar vein, members of the House whose party
membership is terminated pursuant to Section 118(8) may challenge their terminations
before the Constitutional Court.108
The Court is also empowered with a function which does not fit easily into any of
the categories utilized in this paper but which relates most fundamentally to the
upholding of the Constitution generally. Section 63 prohibits any person from exercising
101 Thai Const., ch. XIII, sec. 321.
102 Thai Const., ch. X, pt. 1, sec. 295.
103 See, Thai Const., ch. VII, sec. 218.
104 Thai Const., ch. VII, sec. 219.
105 Thai Const., ch. III, sec. 47.
106 Thai Const., ch. VI, pt. I, sec. 96.
107 Thai Const., ch. VII, sec. 216; cf., Thai Const., ch. VI, pt. I, sec. 96.
108 Thai Const., ch. VI, pt. II, sec. 118.
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the rights and liberties prescribed in the Constitution to overthrow the democratic
regime of government with the King as Head of the State under this Constitution
or to acquire the power to rule the country by any means which is not in
accordance with the modes provided in this Constitution.109
In order to enforce this prohibition, the Prosecutor General is authorized to submit a
motion to the Constitutional Court to require the cessation of any activities by people or
political parties in violation of this section.1 10 The Court's findings cannot prejudice the
institution of criminal prosecution of the acts, but, where the perpetrator is a political part,
the Court may order its dissolution."'
3. More Broadly
As explained by Pratoomraj, both sections 198 and 264 can be used to enforce
individual rights.12 Courts may refer constitutional questions related to individual cases,
particularly where they form the basis of claims under 113Section 28, to the Constitutional
Court for final adjudication of those issues under Section 264.114 The parties need not
raise the constitutional issue or request a decision on the issue for a court to submit it to
the Constitutional Court." 5 Courts may refer any question falling within the ambit of
Section 6 (the Thai version of the Supremacy Clause)16 to the Constitutional Court for
final decision. However, if the issue is not essential for decision of the court's case, the
Constitutional Court may refuse to accept the submission." 7
109 Thai Const., ch. III, sec. 63.
"1 Ibid.
" Ibid.
112 Pratoomraj, Konkay Khumkhrong Sitthi Manutsayachon (Mechanisms for the Protection of Human
Rights), p. 11-14.
113 Thai Const., ch. III, sec. 28; see also, Klein, "The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997," p.1 9
(commenting on the import and utility of Section 28).
114 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 264.
115 Ibid.
116 See, Thai Const., ch. I, sec. 6.
117 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 264.
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In pursuance of its duty to investigate claims against the government,118 wherever
the Ombudsman determines a question of constitutionality is presented, it is authorized to
submit the case with an opinion to the Constitutional Court.119 It can, therefore, be seen
that the power granted to the Court under these sections is not limited to the enforcement
of individual rights. Indeed, these means provide a path for a great number of
constitutional issues to come before the Court, including some which could come before
the Court by other means.
C. Independence
Numerous provisions in the Constitution can be seen as advancements in the quest
for an independent judicial body entrusted with upholding the Constitution. However, to
claim the Constitution provides the court with unfettered independence in carrying out its
duties120 goes too far. First, to claim that any court is completely independent is to
disregard courts' reliance on the public's and the parties' perception of their legitimacy
and authority to ensure compliance with their decisions. Second, the provisions aimed at
increasing the independence of the Constitutional Court are deficient in several aspects.
For example, the Court is provided its own independent secretariat, and the Office of the
Constitutional Court is granted "autonomy in personnel administration, budget and other
activities as provided by law.",2' This is definitely a positive sign for the independence
of the Court,122 but it cannot support a claim that the Court is completely independent in
this regard because these decisions and actions are to be made "as provided by law." The
18 See, Thai Const., ch. VI, pt. VII, sec. 197.
119 Thai Const., ch. VI, pt. VII, sec. 198.
120 See, Khwanmuang, "Saan Ratthathammanun (The Constitutional Court)," p. 323.
121 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 270.
122 Accord, Nanakorn, "Re-making of the Constitution in Thailand," pp. 110-111 (emphasizing this factor
as indicative of the Court's independence); Thongdhamachat and Traymad, Wiwiatthanakan khong Rabop
Ratthathammanun Thai (The Evolution of the Thai Constitutional Systems), pp. 72-73 (same);
Khwanmuang, "Saan Ratthathammanun (The Constitutional Court)," p. 323 (same).
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law, of course, is made by political bodies, thus, for example, while specific budgetary
allocations may not be influenced by Parliament, the total available can be.
Another constitutional provision which may be cause for concern regarding the
Court's independence is Section 252 which requires all judges to swear an oath of loyalty
to the King.1 This is concerning in that it elevates judges' commitment to the King
above their commitment to the law and the Constitution. Thus, judges are beholden to
the King and might be required to sacrifice the law at His request, should the King so
decide. This concern is worsened by the vestment in the King of the ultimate power to
appoint and remove judges.124 While these powers held by the King may be explained as
mere formalities, the tremendous amount of deference to the King in Thai society 12 5
means that the possibility exists that, should he so choose, the King could make this
power effective rather than merely formal without facing popular opposition.
Although the ultimate power of removal lies with the King, the Constitution
provides the people and the Parliament with a means of removing Constitutional Court
judges 126 for "unusual wealthiness indicative of the commission of corruption,
malfeasance in office, malfeasance in judicial office or an intentional exercise of power
contrary to the provisions of the Constitution or law ... 1." 27 This power could be
wielded for political reasons and could work toward undermining the Court's
123 See, Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. I, sec. 252.
124 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. I, sec. 251.
125 See, "The Modern Monarchy," Website of the Royal Thai Consulate - General: Hong Kong,
http://www.thai-consulate.org.hk/modem monarchy.htm (discussing the King's role in quelling uprisings).
A more recent example is that, according to reports, after speaking with the King, Thaksin - one of the
most politically and economically powerful men in Southeast Asia - agreed to step down as Prime Minister.
(Thomas Fuller, "Thaksin Steps Down as Leader of Thailand," International Herald Tribune, April 5, 2006,
available online at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/04/news/thai.php.
126 See, Thai Const., ch. X, pt. III, cf. Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 260(6).
127 Thai Const., ch. X, pt. III, sec. 303.
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independence. 128 That this type of appointment is typical of supreme or constitutional
courts, the US Supreme Court is an example, does not detract from this argument (once
again looking to the politicization of appointments to the Supreme Court in the US as an
example of this danger). In contrast to this possible cause for concern is the possibility
that the qualifications and prohibitions applied to the judges may be insufficient to ensure
their independence from political matters. For example, judges can actively engage in
not-for-profit organizations or in un-paid, nonpermanent government positions 129 without
running afoul of either Section 256 or Section 258. Such activities may be just as,
possibly more, influential on a judge's deliberations than some of the proscribed
activities. The focus on money and profit may be too narrow in this setting as a means to
prevent corruption. Thus, Klein's assertion that "Constitutional Court judges must
demonstrate that they are above politics" 130 claims too much in that judges are not
required to prove they are apolitical; rather they are required only to show they are not
too political in specific ways. Moreover, many of the qualifications, as noted above, do
not apply to the seven judges who come from other courts. While this may be mitigated
to some extent by whatever qualifications judges appointed to the Supreme Court and the
Supreme Administrative Court must meet and the overlap between the qualifications
required by Section 256 and the prohibitions mandated by Section 258, there may still be
a gap in the requirements which could prove significant in protecting the Court's
independence.
128 See, Thongdhamachat and Traymad, Wiwiatthanakan khong Rabop Ratthathammanun Thai (The
Evolution of the Thai Constitutional Systems), pp. 73 (noting the Senate's power to remove judges in this
context).
129 Section 250's provision prohibiting judges from being political officials or holding political office may
abate this concern, but such a reading of Section 250 as to prohibit all governmental activity, surely renders
the provisions related to current governmental positions in Sections 256 and 258 superfluous and cannot be
sustained.
130 Klein, "The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997," p.1 9 .
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Nanakorn posits that the constitutional provision requiring the Court and each
judge to produce an opinion in every case it decides was designed "[t]o promote
transparency with respect to Court decisions .... "131 This is certainly sensible and could
serve as a means of enforcing an increase in the independence of the Court, assuming
judges decisions accurately reflected all of the considerations which led to their decisions.
Another possible problem regarding the independence stems from the fact that the
judges are appointed for finite terms rather than for life.' 32 While re-appointment is
prohibited, 133 this does not mean that judges have no incentives for furthering their
careers after the expiration of their terms. Therefore the possibility remains that judges
could cater to the interests of those in whose hands their future careers rest, be they in
politics, government, or elsewhere.' 34
Lastly, some of the provisions regulating the activities of Constitutional Court
judges with the apparent aim of increasing the independence of the Court seem to be in
tension with the fundamental guarantees embodied in the Constitution. First, Buddhist
clergy are prohibited from being elected to the Court.135 It is difficult to reconcile this
prohibition with the freedom of religion and the "full liberty to profess a religion, a
religious sect or creed, and observe religious precepts or exercise a form of worship in
accordance with his or her belief .... "136 Considering that this prohibition does not
131 Nanakorn, "Re-making of the Constitution in Thailand," p. 111.
132 See, Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 259 (specifying 9 years as the duration of a term).
133 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 259.
134 In addition to this concern, establishing the Constitutional Court as, arguably, the most prestigious
judicial institution in Thailand and then creating a system for the determination of its composition which
includes election from other courts would seemingly politicize those institutions, although this
politicization would be of an internal rather than an external nature. This could be seen as a harmful side
effect, though not one that would directly influence the independence of the Constitutional Court.
135 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 256(4) (incorporating characteristics mandated disenfranchisement), cf.
Thai Const., ch. VI, pt. II, sec. 106(2) (disenfranchising Buddhist clergy).
136 Thai Const., ch. III, sec. 38.
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extend to clergy of other faiths, this also seems to contradict Section 30 of the
Constitution which states: "All persons are equal before the law and shall enjoy equal
protection under the law." 137 Also, the various prohibitions on certain kinds or political
participation seem at odds with Section 47's provision that "[a] person shall enjoy the
liberty to unite and form a political party for the purpose of making political will of the
people and carrying out political activities in fulfillment of such will....."13 8 While this
is not the place for an in-depth analysis of these tensions and apparent inconsistencies,
they are noted as possibly detrimental to the Court institutional integrity, particularly in
the eyes of the public, which could lead to discrepancies between what the public
believes to be right and what the Constitution states, thus compromising the Court's
effectiveness.
IV. Reality - What It Is and Does
Thailand's Constitutional Court has now been extant for about eight years and has
developed a rich jurisprudence which is made available to the public on the Court's
website and through various publications,139 in addition to news sources.40 Thus, the
resources for research into the workings of the Court and its jurisprudence is now
available and the opportunity for evaluation ripe. However, such an undertaking cannot
be accomplished in a single paper; it is therefore hoped that this effort will spur further
research into both the Court's jurisprudence and its functioning within the framework of
the 1997 Constitution and the reforms and principles it embodies. Given this purpose,
this section will briefly discuss the Court's independence as demonstrated by its actions
137 Thai Const., ch. III, sec. 30.
138 Thai Const., ch. III, se. 47.
139 See, Raksasataya and Klein, The Constitutional Court of Thailand, pp. 39-40 (listing various sources
and discussing accessibility).
140 See, e.g., Bangkok Post (numerous articles mentioning or discussing the Court); New York Times
(Same).
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and as perceived by observers. From that point, the section will briefly address the how,
the who, and the what of the Court's cases - how they have come before the Court, who
has brought them, and what they've been about. Due to the number of cases the Court
has adjudicated and the limited scope of this paper, summary overviews and brief,
illustrative examples will be utilized to how cases have come before the Court and who
has brought them. What the cases have covered, being a rather broad topic, will, for the
most part, be discussed using illustrative examples rather than summary overviews.
A. Independence
In the eyes of some commentators 141 and many citizens, 14 2 the decision handed
down by the Constitutional Court in 2001 in Thaksin's case 143 clearly answered the
question of whether the Court enjoyed political independence. Ruling on a Section 295
referral from the NCCC, the Court declined to find that Thaksin had intentionally failed
to submit complete and accurate financial records as required by Section 292.144
Commentators have made much of the fact that only four judges actually found Thaksin
was innocent while four judges held that the case should be dismissed because, according
to their reading, "Thaksin was not required under Section 292 to submit any asset and
141 See, e.g., Duncan McCargo and Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand, (NIAS Press 2005),
. 15-17.
This is demonstrated by the public reaction to the decision generally and the petitions requiring at least
50,000 signatures which were filed seeking the impeachment of four of the Constitutional Court judges
who found in favor of Thaksin. See, Raksasataya and Klein, eds., The Constitutional Court of Thailand, pp.
74-76.
143 Decision No. 20/2544.
144 Ibid. Pasuk and Baker summarize the case in context:
Around a month before the January 2001 election that returned Thaksin Shinawatra as prime
minister of Thailand, the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) charged that he had
concealed assets on three occasions over 1997-8 when he had been obliged to file statements as a
[deputy prime] minister. The amounts involved were 2.4 billion baht, 1.5 billion baht, and 0.6
billion baht. The had been registered in the names of his housekeeper, maid, driver, security guard,
and business colleagues. Two of these domestic servants had for some time figured among the top
ten holders of shares on the stock exchange. If found guilty, Thaksin faced a ban from politics for
five years.
Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand, (Chiang Mai 2004),
pp. 1-2.
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liability statements because he had formally assumed and left office before the 1997
Constitution came into effect. . .",145 and the seven remaining judges found Thaksin
"guilty".146 These commentators have described the decision as "confusing,"147
"curious," 148 and the result of a "procedural quirk in the manner in which votes were
counted by the Court... ."149 The press has blasted the Court's independence: "When a
Constitutional Court acquitted Mr. Thaksin ... the tenuous logic of its decision
seemed ... to have been influenced by a tidal wave of popular support for the prime
minister." 150 As recently as this year, it was clear the Court's reputation had suffered in
the eyes of the press: "Though the Thai Constitutional Court is supposed to be
independent, it is in fact heavily influenced by politics."'5 '
Thaksin's case definitely affected the public and academic perception of the
Court's independence. While it was the most politically-charged case the Court has
adjudicated, and thus probably the most important to study in terms of the degree of the
Court's independence, this stress on one of the Court's hundreds of decisions seems both
disproportionate and unlikely to harm significantly the Court's reputation in the long term
for several reasons. First, the "procedural quirk" in counting the votes for and against
does not seem at all out of place to those familiar with legal institutions. The
"quirkiness" or "curiosity" to be found in the way the votes were counted depends on
how the issues involved are framed. Those who find the Court's decision out of place
145 Klein, The Constitutional Court of Thailand, p. 71.
146 See, e.g., McCargo and Pathmanand, Thaksinization, p. 16; Pasuk and Baker, Thaksin, p. 5; Raksasataya
and Klein, The Constitutional Court of Thailand, pp. 71-76. Klein's account is particularly useful in that it
discusses the reasoning of each of the factions into which this case split the Court.
147 McCargo and Pathmanand, Thaksinization, p. 16.
148 Pasuk and Baker, Thaksin, p. 5.
149 Raksasataya and Klein, The Constitutional Court of Thailand, p. 71.
150 Seth Mydans, "Thai King Uses Influence To Undercut Prime Minister," New York Times, Section 1A;
Column 1; Foreign Desk; Pg. 15.
151 "Let's Decriminalise Defamation," Bangkok Post January 8, 2006 Sunday.
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frame the relevant question as one of guilt or innocence, thus discounting the votes of the
four judges who held Section 295 was inapplicable and expressing wonderment at
Thaksin's "acquittal" when seven of the remaining eleven judges found him "guilty". 152
However, the case was not criminal in nature but administrative, even political, 153 so the
use of guilt or innocence in the legal sense is misplaced. As correctly understood then,
the question was not whether he did it (or, more correctly, didn't do it), but whether he
failed to do something the Constitution required him to do. Four judges found he did not
intentionally fail to disclose information regarding his personal finances while four found
the Constitution did not require him to make such a disclosure in the first place. Thus,
when the proper question is asked ("Did he fail to do what the Constitution requires?"), it
makes perfect sense to find a majority of eight judges answering "no".
Other reasons exist which mitigate the harm done to the Court's reputation. First,
it could be argued that the Court's disposition of the case actually increased its
independence by dodging what was described by some as a political attempt at
Thaksin.1 Second, given the immense political power Thaksin wielded at the time, even
if the Court's decision can be seen as bowing to that power, it is understandable, even if
not justifiable. Thus, the Court might be seen as less than completely independent (which,
as noted above, is the best it could be hoped to achieve).
By 2003 Klein could claim that, with a three significant exceptions,155 "[t]he
general public and media have perceived the Court to have made its decision without
152 See, e.g., McCargo and Pathmanand, Thaksinization, p. 16; Pasuk and Baker, Thaksin, p. 5 (citing
Klein); Raksasataya and Klein, The Constitutional Court of Thailand, p. 71.
153 The penalty to be imposed for failure to comply with Section 292 is that one is prohibited from running
for political office for five years.154 See, Pasuk and Baker, Thaksin, pp. 2-3.
155 Klein discusses the case of Deputy Minister of Agriculture Newin Chidchop (Decision No. 36/2542) in
depth (pp. 61-64) and also mentions Sanoh's case (p. 77). However, these cases are rarely, if ever,
discussed by court-observers since the Thaksin case.
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undue political interference or pressure .... "156 However, it has been claimed that since
then the Court has been taken "under control" by Thaksin.157 The only evidence offered
for this claim was the appointment of three pro-Thaksin judges upon the conclusion of
the terms of four judges who had not been seen as puppets and the election of a judge
seen as pro-Thaksin as the President of the Court.158 This evidence is insufficient to
support the conclusion that the Court is now under Thaksin's thumb. Knowing who is on
the Court, while possibly relevant, is insufficient to determine what the Court will do. No
evidence of the Court's actions since those appointments was offered to support this
claim, and a review of the Court's decisions since those appointments does not reveal any
significant change in the Court's jurisprudence,159 though a deeper analysis may reveal
some significant changes. Moreover, even if the claim that the Court was under
Thaksin's thumb was accurate, it is doubtful such influence will persist as a hindrance to
the Court's independence, given the personal nature of the evidence cited in support of
this claim,160 now that Thaksin has stepped down from the position of Prime Minister.161
As a final note on the Court's independence, it should be noted that it is
empowered to decide not only strictly legal questions but questions more correctly
classified as belonging to the field of political science, such as the proper division of
power between constitutional bodies.162 Thus, it could be said that its job is more
15 6 Raksasataya and Klein, The Constitutional Court of Thailand, p. 77.
157 McCargo and Pathmanand, Thaksinization, p. 176.
158 Ibid., pp. 175-76.
159 At least ten Section 295 have been referred to the Court since these appointments and all cases have
resulted in a finding in accordance with the NCCC's findings, just like every other case besides Thaksin's
that has come before the Court. Also, the Court's jurisprudence demonstrates a general deference to
governmental institutions and laws both before and after these appointments. In short, it is unclear that
these appointments have or will have any significant effect on the Court's jurisprudence.160 Pasuk and Baker, Thaksin, 175-76.
161 See, "Thaksin Bowing Out," Bangkok Post, April 5, 2006, available online at www.bangkokpost.com.
162 See, Thai Const. ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 266.
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political in nature than most courts, making complete political independence not only
practically impossible, but theoretically implausible. It is worth reiteration that no court,
since they are all dependent on the will of the people and other governmental bodies for
enforcement, exists or operates completely independent of political considerations.
B. The Court's Practice
Through December 29, 2005, the Court had decided 447 cases. In order to gain
an overall perspective on what the Court has don since its inception, these cases have
been summarized in a chart appended to this paper. This review reveals a plethora of
information which cannot be fully digested in a single paper. Rather, this paper provides
an overview of the Court's cases and decisions, analyzing some of the more important
and interesting lines of cases as well as individual decisions in greater detail. Each topic
addressed is worthy of study in greater detail, but the foundation for such work must first
be laid.
In gathering the information for this paper, the decisions were reviewed
summarily due to the large number of cases and the depth of the issues addressed. For
the years 2004 and 2005 and for a few of the cases from the prior years, only Thai
summaries (and in a few instances, only the full decisions in Thai) were available for
analysis on the Court's website and were thus used. Where available (i.e., for the
majority of the Court's decisions through 2003), the official English summaries were
relied on for the information condensed into the chart. From the data gathered in the
chart, a cursory analysis designed to address three basic questions is made possible. The
three questions to be addressed in this section are: 1) How have cases come before the
Court? 2) Who has brought these cases? 3) What were these cases about? While the data
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included in the chart and the questions asked lead to other questions of great interest and
import, those must be left for future writings. In answering the questions asked above, it
should be noted that, while there may be a great deal of overlap between the categories
thus created, 163 there remains value in analyzing each separately.
These questions will be answered for the purpose of laying the foundation for an
analysis of the Court's functional and institutional performance as measured against the
roles it was intended to play at its inception, as well as against logic and reason relating to
good governance and administration.
1. How Cases Come Before the Court
How a case comes before the Court often influences whether the Court can take
jurisdiction and how it ultimately disposes of the case. For example, had the powers of
senior police officials to conduct certain types of searches and seizures been challenged
under Section 264 rather than under Section 266, the Court would likely have had to
address the merits of the claim rather than being able to choose not to accept it by
preliminarily ruling that the Minister of Interior was merely a part of a constitutional
organ, and thus not an "organ under the Constitution" for purposes of Section 266.164
Therefore, understanding the paths cases have taken to the Court and how it has dealt
with cases when viewed in this context can aid in understanding its jurisprudence as well
as its institutional capacity and activity.
The multiplicity of paths to the Court discussed in section III(B) above means that
the same question can come up in various setting and through various means. In fact,
Decision No. 3-4/2545 exemplifies this very possibility. The Senate had used both
163 For example, all cases brought under Section 295 (answering the how) were brought by the NCCC
(answering the who).
1 Decision No. 2/2541.
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Section 266 and Section 262 to submit its opinion to the Court that the House of
Representatives had not followed constitutional procedure in its handling of The Bill on
Operational Immunities of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.165
The Court, recognizing the uniformity of issues, though presented under different
jurisdictional provisions, combined the cases into a single unit for decision on the
merits.166
The chart below offers an overall picture of how cases have come before the
Court. As it demonstrates, the majority of cases have been sent to the Court under
Section 264, meaning they were referred by other courts. It is also worth mentioning that
some of the means available for bringing cases before the Court have yet to be utilized.
In deciding cases brought under each section, the Court interprets the limits of its
jurisdiction under the given section. Additionally, an analysis of the types of jurisdiction
the Court has been called upon to exercise is useful in evaluating its functioning and
continuing utility. In addition to the chart provided below, a chart listing the decision
numbers and years of the cases brought under each section is appended to this paper.
Each section which has been utilized to bring at least one case before the Court will be
discussed in turn, looking to the Court's interpretation and practice under each.
165 Decision No. 3-4/2545.
166Iid
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How Cases Have Come Before the Court
[]Section 264 (257)
Section 328 (76)
Q Section 266 (50)
Q Section 295 (29)
U Section 262 (13)
Q Section 198 (10)




a) Section 264167 Cases - Referrals from Other Courts (257)
As noted above and made clear from the chart, by far the most common way for
cases to get to the Court is to be referred by other courts in accordance with Article 264
of the Constitution. This provision allows courts of all levels to refer Constitutional
questions to the Constitutional Court. While this mechanism involves referral from
another court, this is not properly understood as appellate jurisdiction. Rather, the Court
is the court of first instance for all questions involving the interpretation of the
Constitution. The scope of its authority is extremely limited - narrowly restricted to
constitutional issues, but its decisions within that scope are authoritative, final, and
167 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 264:
In the application of the provisions of any law to any case, if the Court by itself is of the opinion
that, or a party to the case raises an objection that, the provisions of such law fall within the
provisions of section 6 and there has not yet been a decision of the Constitutional Court on such
provisions, the Court shall stay its trial and adjudication of the case and submit, in the course of
official service, its opinion to the Constitutional Court for consideration and decision.
In the case where the Constitutional Court is of the opinion that the objection of a party under
paragraph one is not essential for decision, the Constitutional Court may refuse to accept the case
for consideration.
The decision of the Constitutional Court shall apply to all cases but shall not affect final
judgements of the Courts.
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binding on all Thai courts and Constitutional bodies of government. Thus, all types and
levels of courts168 can and have referred questions to the Court, from provincial courts of
first instance 169 to specialty courts170 to the Supreme Court. 171 To ensure the Court has
access to the information required to adjudicate issues submitted to it, the Constitution
grants it "the power to demand documents or relevant evidence from any person ... " and
"to appoint a person or a group of persons to carry out" these duties. 172
In adjudicating its first case brought under this article, the Court has made clear
that Section 264 grants only courts, and not parties coming before them, the right to refer
cases to it.173 In that case, Mrs. Ubon Boonyachalothom, the defendant in a proceeding
before the Nonthaburi Provincial Court, referred two questions to the Court, only the
second of which is relevant for present purposes. In essence, Mrs. Ubon
Boonyachalothorn had requested that the Nonthaburi Provincial Court submit an issue to
the Constitutional Court. However, that court was of the opinion that the issue submitted
to it was not of a nature requiring submission to the Constitutional Court and refused to
do so. In ruling on the petitioners submissions, the Constitutional Court held that Section
264 granted the courts discretion in deciding whether party submissions were of the kind
168 See http://www.judiciary.go.th/eng/thejudiciary.htm#t6 for an explanation of the structure of the Thai
Courts of Justice. See also, Thai Const., ch. VIII (sections regarding the courts); Thongdhamachat and
Traymad, Wiwiatthanakan khong Rabop Ratthathammanun Thai (The Evolution of the Thai Constitutional
Systems), pp. 71-74 (discussing the courts under the Constitution); Phongthaep Thapakanyajana, "Saan
Tam Ratthathammanun Chabap Patchuban (The Courts Under the Current Constitution)," in Bunleud
Khachayutthadech and Prayong Khongmuang, eds., Ruam Sara: Ratthathammanun Chabap Prachachon
(Collected Works: The People's Constitution), (Bangkok 1998), pp. 308-319 (addressing the courts of
justice under the Constitution); Montri Rubsuwan, "Saan Pogkhrang Tam Botbanyad khong
Ratthathammanun Chabap Patchuban (The Administrative Courts According to the Provisions of the
Current Constitution)," in Bunleud Khachayutthadech and Prayong Khongmuang, eds., Ruam Sara:
Ratthathammanun Chabap Prachachon (Collected Works: The People's Constitution), (Bangkok 1998),
. 338-45 (discussing the administrative courts under the Constitution).
See, e.g., Decision Nos. 5/2541, 8/2541, 9/2541, etc.
170 See, e.g., Decision No. 48/2547 (Bangkok Military Court).
171 See, e.g., Decision Nos. 16/2541, 11/2544, 14/2544, etc.
172 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 265.
173 See, Decision No. 5/2541.
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required by Section 264174 for referral to the Constitutional Court. Where the Nonthaburi
Provincial Court had determined that the issue in this case was not of that kind and
refused to refer the case, the Court could have no jurisdiction under Section 264.
Therefore, the Court voted unanimously not to accept the submission. 175
The ramifications of this decision are profound. First, the Court made apparent
that it would not serve as an appellate body to review the courts' decisions to refer cases
to it. Related to this point, the action taken by the Court in this case sends a message to
courts that they are autonomous, at least with respect to the Constitutional Court, in their
decisions on whether to refer cases under Section 264. Another effect of the Courts
disposition of this case is that it confirmed what commentators already believed (and
what a facial reading of Section 264 indicates) - that referral to the Constitutional Court
under Section 264 was solely the province of the courts and not of parties before them.
In 1999, the Court decided a case in which it held that notifications issued by non-
legislative bodies, the Bank of Thailand in this case, were not "provisions of law" for the
purposes of Section 264. Thus, the Court held that it did not have the power to adjudicate
on submissions regarding such notifications and dismissed the case.176 The holding in
this case is also significant in that it is the first in a line of decisions by the Court not to
hear cases brought under Section 264 relating to notifications issued by what the Court
deems to be non-legislative bodies.177 Including Decision No. 4/2542, the Court has
dismissed forty-six applications - more than one tenth of those it received through the
end of 2005 (the percentage is higher if only the years 1997-2001 are considered) - on
14 See, Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 264.
175 Decision No. 5/2541 (see full Thai version for the listing of judges in unanimity).
176 Decision No. 4/2542.
17 See, Decision Nos. 5/2542, 9/2542, 10/2542, 12-35/2542, 38-40/2542, 41/2542, 42-43/2542, 14-15/2543,
16-19/2543, 25/2543, 9-10/2544 (refusing to consider one of two issues presented), 27/2544, 50/2544
(refusing to consider one of two issues presented), and 55/2548.
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these grounds. It appeared that either courts or litigants had learned their lesson as no
such case was referred to the Court from 2002 through most of 2005. However, in
Decision No. 55/2548, the Court was once again confronted with a case of this nature and
dismissed it as it had the other forty-five cases to come before it. For now, this appears to
be an anomaly rather than a re-emergence of these cases.
This line of cases exemplifies Klein's worry that the Court does not "assess the
constitutionality of rules and regulations the bureaucracy has created to implement
law."178 The Court's refusal to address these implementation provisions is vital because
"[a]ll too often within the Thai context, a law itself may not be unconstitutional; instead
the problem lies with the implementing rules and regulations."179 The Court's continued
refusal to adjudicate the constitutionality of these rules by focusing on the body making
them rather than the body granting that body power to do so demonstrates a hole in the
attempt to ensure the constitutionality of laws in Thailand.
Another important point to be taken from these cases is that the Court gives its
decisions precedential value such that, where it finds the issue in the case at hand is
identical to that presented in a case it has already adjudicated, it will cite that decision
and dismiss the case at hand. While the Court has followed this pattern in numerous
instances, 18 it is particularly noteworthy in this context, given the large number of cases
presenting similar issues.
Decision Nos. 8/2543 and 9/2543 were both handed down on March 2, 2000 and
had both been referred by the Songkhla Provincial Court, but the holdings of each
178 Raksasataya and Klein, The Constitutional Court of Thailand, p. 36.
179Ibd
180 See, e.g., Decision No. 10/2541 (dismissing case where issue presented had been addressed and decided
in Decision No. 4/2541).
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resulted in decisions limiting the Court's jurisdiction in different ways. In Decision No.
8/2543, the Court found that the petitioner was requesting it to interpret a provision of the
Constitution rather than to adjudicate on the constitutionality of the application of law in
a given case, as required by Section 264 and thus dismissed the case.181 It can therefore
be seen that the Court does not allow courts or parties to use Section 264's provisions to
put general requests for declarations of unconstitutionality before it but only interprets
constitutional provisions properly and specifically presented before it in accordance with
the jurisdictional provisions in the Constitution. In Decision No. 9/2543, the Court held
that a court's procedural order allowing a claim of interest without the defendant's
consent did not constitute the application of the provision of any law to this case but
merely the act of a juristic person and thus dismissed the case as not properly brought
under Section 264.182 This decision demonstrates that the Court refuses to be an
appellate court to review the procedural decisions of other courts. These decisions, taken
together, show the Court's propensity to follow a narrow construction of "the application
of the provisions of any law to any case" in establishing, or refusing to establish, its
jurisdiction.
On May 2, 2001, the Court issued a decision in which it declined the invitation to
determine whether certain provisions of law were in accordance with the Civil Procedure
Code. While the Court held there were issues which were properly brought under
Section 264, it dismissed those related to the interpretation of the Civil Procedure Code.
It can therefore be seen that the Court does not understand Section 264 as granting it the
181 Decision No. 8/2543.
182 Decision No. 9/2543.
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power to resolve conflicting laws which are not claimed to contravene the
Constitution. 13
Although outside of this paper's limited scope, there are several extremely
interesting questions related to the Court's practice under Section 264 which would
provide excellent topics for future research. One such topic would focus on the courts
referring cases to the Constitutional Court. Which Courts do so most often? Are there
courts that seem reluctant to do so? If so, is this reluctance explainable by institutional
and functional differences (less constitutional issues may be presented in the cases that
come before courts of different types) or is there a greater reluctance to refer issues to the
Court (this could be studied by looking into the practice of courts with similar
jurisdictions, such as provincial courts of different provinces)? These questions and their
answers would help us better understand the Court's role and its effectiveness, since, as
noted above, it is reliant on courts for referral of constitutional issues and is without
means of requiring them to do so.
b) Section 328(2)184 Cases - Dissolution of Political Parties
(76) and Section 295185 Cases - NCCC Referrals (29)
183 Decision No. 16/2544.
184 Thai Const., ch. XIII, sec. 328, cf. Organic Law of the Political Party Act, art. 65 (mandating the
Political Party Registrar submit cases involving political parties' failure to comply with Section 328, thus
requiring dissolution, to the Constitutional Court for final order of dissolution).
185 Thai Const., ch. X, pt. I, sec. 295:
Any person holding a political position who intentionally fails to submit the account showing
assets and liabilities and the supporting documents as provided in this Constitution or intentionally
submits the same with false statements or conceals the facts which should be revealed shall vacate
office as from the date of the expiration of the time limit for the submission under section 292 or
as from the date such act is discovered, as the case may be, and such person shall be prohibited
from holding any political position for five years as from the date of the vacation of office. When
the case under paragraph one occurs, the National Counter Corruption Commission shall refer the
matter to the Constitutional Court for further decision, and when the decision of the Constitutional
Court is given, the provisions of section 97 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
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From a jurisdictional standpoint, these cases are pretty uninteresting. The two
sections served as the basis for jurisdiction in 105 cases over the period studied. In none
of these cases did the Court find it lacked jurisdiction to decide the issues presented,
upholding the submissions of the Political Party Registrar under Section 328 in every
instance and upholding those of the NCCC under Section 295 in every instance but one
(that being Thaksin's case).
c) Section 266186 Cases - Conflict of Powers (50)
The Court has had the opportunity to define its jurisdiction under this section in a
number of cases and has demonstrated a willingness to interpret its jurisdiction fairly
narrowly. In the first case in which it did so under this section, Decision No. 2/2541
discussed above, the Court adopted a construction of "organs under the Constitution"
which was exclusive of the Ministry of Interior as it was only a part of an organ
established by the Constitution.187 The equation of "under" with "by" is significant
because "under" could be interpreted to mean governed by, covered by, or in accordance
with as opposed to being created or regulated directly by provisions in the
Constitution. 8 8 Had the Court adopted this broader interpretation, it would have had
jurisdiction to decide No. 2/2541 as well as other cases which either were not submitted
because of that decision or which were not accepted on similar grounds.189 The Court has
186 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 266:
In the case where a dispute arises as to the powers and duties of organs under the Constitution,
such organs or the President of the National Assembly shall submit a matter together with the
opinion to the Constitutional Court for decision.
187 See, Decision No. 2/2541.
188 The word in Thai (taam) is translated as under but might be better translated as "according to" or "in
accordance with." The difference is of little import, however, as the ambiguity discussed above is present
in Thai as well as in the English translations.
189 See, e.g., Decision Nos. 58-62/2543 (failing to accept submissions of local administrative organizations
because they were not members)
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also held that constitutional organs cannot make submissions under Section 266 on behalf
of others; rather, the submitting organ must be the involved in the dispute.190
Another way in which the Court has limited its jurisdiction under Section 266 is
by refusing to act as arbiter for internal disputes within arising within constitutional
organs. For example, when the NCCC submitted a request for guidance regarding its
fact-finding function, the Court did not accept the application because it found no dispute
among various constitutional organs as it read Section 266 to require, only an internal
question about how the NCCC was to perform a function the Constitution clearly
empowered it to perform.191 The Court has also refused similar "consultation"
submissions seeking resolution of internal matters made by the Election Commission,19 2
the State Audit Commission,193 the Senate,194 the Council of Ministers,195 and the
Ombudsman.196 In a similar vein, the Court has refused to give its stamp of approval to
opinions held by constitutional organs just to give them legitimacy as opposed to
resolving an actual dispute.197
The Court also declined an invitation from the NCCC to review the
constitutionality of a law passed after the promulgation of the Constitution under the
auspices of Section 266.198 Another way in which the Court has limited its power in the
context of Section 266 is by ruling that not all of the powers exercised by constitutional
190 See, Decision No. 7/2541.
191 See, Decision No. 63/2543.
192 See, Decision Nos. 6/2542, 7/2542, 8/2542.
193 See, Decision No. 60/2548.
194 See, Decision No. 43/2546; see also, Decision No. 44/2547.
195 See, Decision No. 29/2548.
196 See, e.g., Decision No. 18/2546; Decision No. 19/2546.
197 See, Decision No. 15/2545.
198 Decision No. 33/2546.
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organs are constitutionally provided and that Section 266 does not authorize it to
adjudicate with regard to these non-constitutionally provided powers. 199
d) Section 262200 - Advisory Opinions (13)
During the period studied, the Court never rejected a submission under Section
262 for jurisdictional issues. This may be due to the relatively few cases submitted under
this section from 1998-2005 or might be because of the explicitness and narrowness of
the section. It provides a means for the legislature to seek advisory opinions from the
Court and is explicit in who may bring such cases and in the procedure to be followed. It
199 See, Decision No. 29/2548.
200 Thai Const., ch. VIII, pt. II, sec. 262:
After any bill or organic law bill has been approved by the National Assembly under section 93 or
has been reaffirmed by the National Assembly under section 94, before the Prime Minister
presents it to the King for signature:
1) if members of the House of Representatives, senators or members of both Houses of not less
than one-tenth of the total number of the existing members of both Houses are of the opinion that
provisions of the said bill are contrary to or inconsistent with this Constitution or such bill is
enacted contrary to the provisions of this Constitution, they shall submit their opinion to the
President of the House of Representatives, the President of the Senate or the President of the
National Assembly, as the case may be, and the President of the House receiving such opinion
shall then refer it to the Constitutional Court for decision and, without delay, inform the Prime
Minister thereof;
2) if not less than twenty members of the House of Representatives, senators or members of both
Houses are of the opinion that the provisions of the said organic law bill are contrary to or
inconsistent with this Constitution or such organic law bill is enacted contrary to this Constitution,
they shall submit their opinion to the President of the House of Representatives, the President of
the Senate or the President of the National Assembly, as the case may be, and the President of the
House receiving such opinion shall then refer it to the Constitutional Court for decision and,
without delay, inform the Prime Minister thereof;
3) if the Prime Minister is of the opinion that the provisions of the said bill or organic law bill are
contrary to or inconsistent with this Constitution or it is enacted contrary to the provisions of this
Constitution, the Prime Minister shall refer such opinion to the Constitutional Court for decision
and, without delay, inform the President of the House of Representatives and the President of the
Senate thereof.
During the consideration of the Constitutional Court, the Prime Minister shall suspend the
proceedings in respect of the promulgation of the bill or organic law bill until the Constitutional
Court gives a decision thereon.
If the Constitutional Court decides that the provisions of such bill or organic law bill are contrary
to or inconsistent with this Constitution or it is enacted contrary to the provisions of this
Constitution and that such provisions of the bill or organic law bill form the essential element
thereof, such bill or organic law bill shall lapse.
If the Constitutional Court decides that the provisions of such bill or organic law bill are contrary
to or inconsistent with this Constitution otherwise than in the case specified in paragraph three,
such conflicting or inconsistent provisions shall lapse and the Prime Minister shall proceed further
in accordance with section 93 or section 94, as the case may be.
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could therefore be said that the Court's jurisdiction under this section is clearer than
under other sections. Such a claim is bolstered by the breadth allowed for reasons to
submit a case to the Court - any conceived inconsistency between the bill and the
Constitution appears to suffice.
e) Section 198201 Cases - Ombudsman (10)
As is the case in the context of Section 262, the Court has never dismissed or
failed to accept an application brought under Section 198. In addition to not having
dismissed any Section 198 cases on jurisdictional grounds, the Court has suggested that
cases dismissed under other sections could have been brought under Section 198,
seemingly encouraging the use of this means of jurisdiction.202 However, the scarcity of
cases brought under this section, particularly given the role commentators believe it
can/should play in the protection of individuals' rights as discussed above and the Court's
apparent willingness to exercise jurisdiction under this section, raises important questions
not answerable within the scope of this paper. What accounts for this scarcity? Do
individuals simply not bring claims to the Ombudsman? If not, does the Ombudsman
apply procedures which are prohibitive or have internal standards for referral of cases to
the Constitutional Court which are overly restrictive?
f) Section 219203 Cases (4)
201 Thai Const., ch. VI, pt. VII, sec. 198:
In the case where the Ombudsman is of the opinion that the provisions of the law, rules,
regulations or any act of any person under section 197(1) begs the question of the constitutionality,
the Ombudsman shall submit the case and the opinion to the Constitutional Court or
Administrative Court for decision in accordance with the procedure of the Constitutional Court or
the law on the procedure of the Administrative Court, as the case may be.
The Constitutional Court or Administrative Court, as the case may be, shall decide the case
submitted by the Ombudsman under paragraph one without delay.
202 See, Decision No., 58-62/2543.
203 Thai Const., ch. VII, sec. 219:
Before the House of Representatives or the Senate approves an Emergency Decree under section
218 paragraph three, members of the House of Representatives or senators of not less than one-
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The Court did not dismiss any of the four cases brought under this section for
reasons related to jurisdiction. The probable reasons for the lack of jurisprudence on this
topic are similar to some of those offered regarding Section 262 - scarcity of cases and
the narrowness and explicitness of the Court's jurisdiction under this section. Cases of
this sort can only come up in the context of Emergency Decrees and, even more narrowly,
in instances where such decrees are being withheld and a bill with a similar purpose is
perceived to have been presented. Therefore, the rarity of submissions under this section
is not surprising.
g) Section 192 Cases (3)
The Court's jurisdiction under this section is noteworthy in that Section 192 does
not actually confer jurisdiction on the Court. Rather, it only sets a basic requirement for
organic laws to be promulgated pursuant to the Constitution. However, some of the
organic laws thus created have included provisions granting the Court jurisdiction in
certain circumstances. The basis for jurisdiction in all three of the cases the Court has
addressed under this section is found in Section 17 (directly of via Section 33) of the
fifth of the total number of the existing members of each House have the right to submit an
opinion to the President of the House of which they are members that the Emergency Decree is not
in accordance with section 218 paragraph one, and the President of the House who receives such
opinion shall then refer it to the Constitutional Court for decision. After the Constitutional Court
has given a decision thereon, it shall notify its decision to the President of the House referring
such opinion.
When the President of the House of Representatives or the President of the Senate has received the
opinion from members of the House of Representatives or senators under paragraph one, the
consideration of such Emergency Decree shall be deferred until the decision of the Constitutional
Court under paragraph one has been notified.
In the case where the Constitutional Court decides that any Emergency Decree is not in
accordance with section 218 paragraph one, such Emergency Decree shall not have the force of
law ab initio.
The decision of the Constitutional Court that an Emergency Decree is not in accordance with
section 218 paragraph one must be given by votes of not less than two-thirds of the total number
of members of the Constitutional Court.
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Organic Act on Political Parties, B.E. 2541 (1998), which allows political party leaders
recourse to the Court for review of NCCC actions affecting their parties. 204
h) Cases Under Section 96 (2) and Other Sections (3)
These sections, most likely due to their scarcity, have yet to yield much
jurisprudence of interest on jurisdictional issues. All of the jurisdictional grants found in
these sections (96, 47, 118, and 180) are basically procedural in nature. It is unlikely that
they were intended to usher in large numbers of cases before the Court. Therefore, the
scarcity of these cases, unlike that in the Section 198 setting for example, should not
cause concern in an analysis of the Court's institutional functioning.
i) Sections Yet to be Utilized
Several possible means of acquiring jurisdiction discussed in section III (B) have
yet to be utilized to bring cases before the Court. If these sections were originally
intended for regular utilization, this lack could be cause for concern. On the other hand,
if these sections were primarily included to cover theoretical gaps or as minor checks on
political power, the lack of cases being brought under them would be an indication that
things are going as planned. A cursory analysis of these sections indicates the latter is the
more accurate description of what is taking place. Given the prerequisites for a case to be
brought under Section 63 described above, the lack of any such case is cause for
satisfaction rather than concern. That no cases have been brought under Section 142,
which allows legislators to challenge the qualifications of members of the Election
Commission, barring accusations that Election Commission members are actually not
qualified, is also a positive sign. Given the similarity to Section 219, the lack of cases
brought under Section 177 is unsurprising, largely for the reasons stated in the discussion
204 See, Decision No. 30/2543, Decision No. 12/2546, Decision No. 46/2546.
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of Section 219. That no cases have been brought under Section 263 is merely an
indication that there have been no serious constitutional objections to the rules governing
legislative procedure. The last two sections yet to be utilized, Section 321 and Section
324, probably never will be as they granted jurisdiction for the Court to review the
provisional rules to be established by the NCCC and the Election Commission prior to
the promulgation of organic laws. That no cases were ever brought is also a good sign.
2. Who has Brought Cases Before the Court?
Another way to evaluate the institutional working of the Court is by analyzing
who has been bringing cases before it as well as who has been prohibited from doing so
or simply not taken the opportunity. This consideration merits attention because narrow
construction of standing provisions in the Constitution or organic laws, or reluctance to
utilize these, could result in the system's failure to function in accordance with the
Constitution by unnecessarily narrowing the group of persons or entities permitted to
make submissions to the Court, thus depriving them of the opportunity to make the
Court's power of efficacy by putting it to use.
As outlined above, numerous persons and entities are granted standing to submit
cases to the Court for adjudication and decision through various constitutional and
organic law provisions. In the analysis offered below, these are categorized into three
loose groups, essentially distinguished by the functions they play in relation to the
Court's mandate to uphold and interpret the Constitution.
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Who Has Brought Cases 0 Courts (256)
Before the Court III Political Party Registrar (76)
o NCCC (34)
o National Assembly (17)
Senate (14)
0 Ombudsman (13)
* House of Representatives (12)
o Election Commission (8)
Provinces and Tambons (7)
*I Party Representatives and
Leaders (4)
o Council of Ministers (4)
Q State Audit Commission (1)
® Individuals (1)
a) Constitutional Enforcement Bodies
Various bodies created to enforce the reforms embodied in the Constitution have
utilized constitutional provisions which grant them standing to bring cases before the
Court in order to 1) clarify their constitutional mandates and to 2) fulfill their
constitutional roles. As discussed above, when these bodies have attempted to receive
clarification regarding their roles and responsibilities under the Constitution, the Court
has refused the invitations, effectively deferring interpretation of constitutionally-granted
powers to those bodies except where such powers are disputed by another constitutional
organ. However, the Court has taken the opportunity on several occasions to speak to the
powers of these bodies in cases where it did find a dispute between constitutional organs
under Section 266. Many of these cases were brought before the Court early on and
48
involved elections and various issues related to them and are usefully summarized and
analyzed by Klein.205
More relevant for present purposes than what these cases were about is who
brought them. Thus, the Court has heard and adjudicated on cases brought by the
NCCC,206 the Election Commission, 2 07 and the Ombudsman. 2 08 While the Court did not
accept the application of the State Audit Commission in a 2005 case, it was not because it
lacked standing under Section 266.209 The second reason constitutional enforcement
bodies have submitted cases to the Court is to comply with their duties as provided in the
Constitution. Thus, the NCCC,2 10 Political Party Registrar, 211 and the Ombudsman2 12
have all brought cases before the Court in pursuance of their constitutional duties. While
the who rather than the what is the relevant consideration here, it is worth noting that
Klein also addressed the cases which had been brought by the NCCC regarding failure to
comply with the reporting requirements of Section 292 in accordance with its standing
under Section 295.213
The most glaring omission from these lists is the National Human Rights
Commission (NHRC). Although it has never attempted to bring a case under Section 266,
there appears to be nothing to bar it from doing so, should a dispute arise between it and
another constitutional organ. The reason for its exclusion from the second list is more
205 Raksasataya and Klein, eds., The Constitutional Court of Thailand, pp. 46-59.
206 See, Decision Nos. 2/2546 and 36/2547.
207 See, Decision Nos. 3/2541, 15/2541, 13/2543, 52/2546.
208 See, Decision No. 20/2546.
209 See, Decision No. 60/2548 (refusing the application where the Court found no dispute).
210 See, Thai Const., ch. X, pt. I, sec. 295.
21 See, Thai Const., ch. XIII, sec. 328, cf. Organic Law of the Political Party Act, art. 65.
212 See, Thai Const., ch. VI, pt. VII, sec. 198.
213 Raksasataya and Klein, eds., The Constitutional Court of Thailand, pp. 59-76.
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clear - it is not empowered to bring cases before the Court.2 14 Its powers are primarily of
investigation, reference, and recommendation. 15 Thus, while disappointing for those
who would like to see the NHRC play a more influential role in Thai governance and
adjudication, its omission from the above lists cannot properly be understood as an
institutional failure as judged by the Constitution and organic laws made pursuant thereto
nor of the Constitutional Court.
b) Governmental/Political Bodies
Numerous legislative, political, and other bodies have been heard by the Court
and received decisions from the Court addressing widely varying constitutional issues.
As shown in the chart at the beginning of Section IV(B)(2), these groups include the
National Assembly, both legislative houses, courts of all levels and types, sub-national
governmental bodies, political party leaders, and party members. 216 This diversity
suggests compliance with the desire apparent in the Constitution to grant numerous
bodies access to authoritative interpretation regarding the duties of and relationships
between constitutional organs as well as rights and means of compliance with them, as
embodied in the Constitution.
c) Individuals
"There is no right of direct fundamental rights petition to the Constitutional
Court."217 In fact, there is no means for individuals to have any claims heard by the
Court. However, as several writers have pointed out,218 individuals may have their cases
heard by the Court if either a court refers a constitutional issue via Section 264 or the
214 Harding, "Thailand's Reforms," p. 99.
215 Ibid., 98-99.
216 See also, Table 3 in the appendix.
217 Harding, "Thailand's Reforms," p. 96.
218Pramootraj, Harding (noting only the first method), etc.
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Ombudsman brings a case on the individual's behalf under Section 198. Mareike
Woermer, in the preface to the booklet authored by Pratoomraj which had for its purpose
the enabling "of more [Thai] citizens to actively seek protection of their rights," listed the
Constitutional Court as first among bodies offering such protection. 219 However, in
Decision No. 5/2541, described above, the Court made clear that Section 264 does not
grant individuals the requisite standing to come before it; rather, the courts must do so on
their behalf.220 While no case has presented the issue to date, it seems likely the Court
would also bar direct petitions from individuals under Section 198 and give deference to
the Ombudsman in deciding which cases merited submission.
When judged by the intentions codified in the Constitution, therefore, the lack of
acceptance of individuals' petitions should not cause alarm. Of course, students of the
Court and of political science are not so limited. While the Court may be fulfilling its
constitutional functions in this regard, there is much room for argument regarding
whether it is protecting individuals' rights under the Constitution effectively. As can be
seen from Table 4 in the appendix, courts of many levels and types have referred cases to
the Court. The administrative courts have sent an especially high number of cases to the
Court in recent years - 78 total for the years 2004-2005. This constitutes over half (78 of
147) of the Court's caseload for that period. It remains to be seen whether this is an
anomaly or the beginning of a trend. On the other hand, not a single case was referred to
the Court by any of the juvenile or family courts. This is particularly interesting given
the number of constitutional provisions which clearly bear on issues adjudicated in those
219 Pratoomraj, Konkay Khumkhrong Sitthi Manutsayachon (Mechanisms for the Protection of Human
Rights), p. i.
220 See, Decision No. 5/2541 (holding individuals have no enforceable right to have their cases heard by the
Court under Section 264).
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courts.2 While numerous courts have referred constitutional issues raised by
individuals and the Ombudsman has done so on occasion, one is left to wonder whether
this is enough to safeguard the individual rights as codified in the Constitution.
3. What Kinds of Cases has the Court Heard? How has It
Decided Them?
The overviews of the Court' jurisdiction and those who have standing to bring
cases before it demonstrates that the Court hears a broad range of cases. Compared to a
supreme court in a common law structure, its jurisdiction is certainly narrower in respect
to legal cases as it is only empowered to decide those relating to the Constitution.
However, its jurisdiction is broader because not all of the cases that come before it,
though related to the Constitution, are not strictly legal in character. Section 266cases,
regarding the powers and duties of constitutional organs, serve as an obvious example.
The Court's structure - including experts in the field of political science - further
supports the conclusion that the Court is intended to hear and decide not only legal claims
but also claims regarding political structure and governance under the 1997 Constitution.
To say that the array of cases presented to the Court is narrower than that of some
courts is not to say it is narrow. Indeed, given the length of the 1997 Constitution and the
breadth of issues it touches, one would expect the Court to have dealt with varying and
diverse cases. A review of the Court's decisions in its first eight calendar years of work
demonstrates that such an expectation has been met. Due to the large body of
jurisprudence developed by the Court during this period, a few of the more dominant or
particularly interesting bodies of case law will be dealt with in order to illustrate this
221 In the juvenile context, many of the due process and liberty protections could apply. Pertaining to the
family, Thai Const., ch. III, sec. 34, dealing with family and privacy rights, is an obvious possibility.
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diversity and to give a feeling for what the Court has done. Although an exhaustive
detailing of cases is beyond the scope of this work, it is hoped that the analysis and
descriptions provided will spur future interest and research on the Court's functioning
and jurisprudence.
a) Human Rights
In order to fulfill its mandate in this area, the Court necessarily employs the
power of judicial review. Overall, the Constitutional Court has been fairly reluctant to
find laws, especially Emergency Decrees and laws purporting to regulate the economy,
unconstitutional. This should not be surprising, given that most courts with similar
powers of judicial review tend to show deference to legislative bodies and their decisions
when faced with similar problems. Another explanation is that legislatures can be
expected to be aware of the Constitution and even to understand it in some depth. Thus,
it is likely that most of what they do will be in concurrence with it.
Cases relating to human rights issues are typically brought before the Court either
by submissions from other courts under Section 264 or by submissions from the
Ombudsman under Section 198. Although the latter, as discussed above, have been
brought relatively rarely (ten cases in eight years, making up less than two and a half
percent of the Court's docket), the decisions that have been rendered in these cases have
demonstrated that it can be an effective means of safeguarding individual rights. The
Court found constitutional violations in four of the ten cases submitted under Section
198.2 Three of these ten cases, all of which were decided in 2003, have involved
222 Decision Nos. 24/2543, 21/2546, 24/2546, and 45/2546.
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allegations of discrimination on the basis of sex, 223 with the Court finding violations in
two of them. In No. 21/2546 the Court held that women could not be required to take the
names of their husbands upon marriage.224 Later in 2003, the Court held that section
20(1) of the Election of Municipal Assembly Members Act, B.E. 2482 (1939), as
amended by the Election of Municipal Assembly Members Act (No. 9), B.E. 2538 (1995)
was unconstitutional insofar as it required candidates with foreign fathers to requirements
in addition to those required of other candidates, thus resulting in discriminatory
treatment in violation of Section 30 of the Constitution.225
The result in the remaining case may not be surprising to those familiar with the
nature of tourism and the understandable disdain felt by some Thais for foreign men
whose primary interest in Thailand is its women (such men are commonly referred to by
Thais as Khii Nog, meaning bird poop). The Court reasoned that the discriminatory
treatment did not result in the complete prevention of foreign men married to Thai
women from attaining nationality, since they could apply for it under other provisions of
the law. Therefore, according to the Court, the difference in treatment - allowing foreign
women married to Thai men a less burdensome way to become Thai nationals than that
available to foreign men married to Thai women - could not be deemed to be unjust
discrimination on the basis of gender in contravention of Section 30 of the
Constitution.226 The reasoning adopted in this case seems rather difficult to square with
that offered by the Court in the case regarding qualifications of candidates discussed in
223 Decision Nos. 21/2546 (constitutionality of requirement that married women take husband's names),
37/2546 (constitutionality of granting nationality to foreign women marrying Thai men but not foreign men
marrying Thai women), 45/2546 (constitutionality of election law holding candidates with foreign fathers
to higher standards).
224 See, Decision Nos. 21/2546.
225 Decision No. 45/2546.
226 Decision No. 37/2545.
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the preceding paragraph. These might be cases where Thai custom might help explain
the outcomes better than the Court's reasoning. In contrast to the disdain felt for foreign
men who come to Thailand to womanize, the offspring of biracial couples (typically
referred to as Luug Khrung) - especially those whose physical appearance is closer to
that of Caucasians - are thought of as good looking and can be seen throughout the ranks
of Thai actors and singers. The Court's decisions, while legally difficult to square with
one another, make perfect sense when judged by the cultural norms disfavoring foreign
men marrying Thai women while favoring (at least, certainly not disfavoring) the
offspring of such relationships.
Three of the cases which did not result in a finding of unconstitutionality involved
laws purported to regulate commerce. 227 One of the other cases which did not result in a
finding of unconstitutionality does give cause for concern to those interested in human
rights. In No. 16/2545, the Court found no violation of the Constitution's prohibition
against "unjust discrimination against a person on the grounds of ... physical or health
condition" 228 where two applicants for the examinations for the selection and recruitment
of judicial official were denied due to polio-related health problems. 229 The Court's
reasoning that judges were sometimes required to do things which might prove difficult
for these two applicants left much to be desired by those seeking protection against
discrimination in employment decisions. If the duties of a judge are so physically
demanding as to justify discrimination on the grounds of physical conditions, bringing
227 Decision Nos. 33/2544 (involving an Emergency Decree regulating receiverships), 64/2547 (Emergency
Decree relating to bankruptcy), and 32/2548 (involving a tax exemption for telecommunications).
228 Thai Const., ch. III, sec. 30.
229 Decision No. 16/2545.
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the case within the exceptions provided by Section 29,230 what hope is left for police
officers, doctors, nurses, lawyers, etc., whose jobs are at least as (or considerably more)
physically demanding?
Given the reasoning adopted by the Court in No. 16/2545 case, the outcome in a
case decided later in 2003 referred by the Central Administrative Court under Section
264 was not surprising, even if disappointing. In that case, the Court found that
preventing a man with physical disabilities from being eligible for the state attorney's
selection examination fell within the exceptions provided in Section 29 of the
Constitution.23 1 The reasoning adopted in this case is even more foreboding than that
adopted in Decision No. 16/2545 because the Court constitutionally justifies the practice
as opposed to finding that it is simply not constitutionally prohibited. The text of Section
29 does not mandate such an interpretation, but the Court has been wont to grant a large
degree of deference to governmental policies or regulations in what is to be considered
"necessary."232
In a case where a Buddhist monk was ousted from his position as a member of a
local Sukhapibal Committee on the grounds that he was a monk, in accordance with a
local law (which apparently mirrored Section 106(2) of the 1997 Constitution in this
regard), the Court relied once again on Section 29 to hold that there was no violation of
230 Thai Const., ch. III, sec. 29 provides:
The restriction of such rights and liberties as recognized by the Constitution shall not be imposed
on a person except by virtue of provisions of the law specifically enacted for the purpose
determined by this Constitution and only to the extent of necessity and provided that it shall not
affect the essential substances of such rights and liberties.
The law under paragraph one shall be of general application and shall not be intended to apply to
any particular case or person; provided that the provision of the Constitution authorizing its
enactment shall also be mentioned therein. The provisions of paragraph one and paragraph two
shall apply mutatis mutandis to rules or regulations issued by virtue of the provisions of the law.
231 See, e.g., Decision No. 16/2545 (discussed above).
232 See, e.g., Decision No. 3/2546 (holding that barring recovery of benefits related to childbirth from
employer for pregnant employees who failed to bring claims within one year was necessary).
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the Constitution, despite Section 38's233 proclamation of religious liberty. Roughly three
years later, the Court held that peaceful protests could be proscribed by law in under
certain circumstances. 2 34
There are at least three types of cases falling under the human rights heading
which have been presented to the Court on several occasions. These cases relate to
criminal law and the rights of accused persons, drug-related laws, and laws prohibiting or
regulating alcohol production and consumption. The first of these sets of cases has been
the most numerous - no less than ten cases related to criminal proceedings and due
process concerns have been submitted to the Court. In each of these cases, the Court has
either simply dismissed the application 235 or upheld the law (normally the application of a
provision of a code of procedure) against the constitutional challenge. 236 The Court has
also upheld the ability of courts to require fees of parties in civil cases.23 7
The Court has dealt with laws related to drugs on at least four occasions and has
upheld the laws against constitutional challenges each time. In so doing, the Court has
upheld the ability of the state to assume intent to sell from possession of relatively large
quantities of drugs, 238 harsher penalties for drug dealers who are government officials, 239
and the taking of suspecting drug money pending trial. 240
233 Thai Const., ch. III, sec. 38.
234 See, Decision No. 62/2545.
235 See, Decision Nos. 2/2541 (dismissing for lack of standing); 5/2541 (same); 1/2543 (dismissing as
moot); 3/2544 (same); 16/2546 (dismissing because the application of law claimed to violate the
Constitution was found to be unrelated to the provision of the Constitution it was claimed to violate
236 See, Decision Nos. 16/2541 (upholding denial of appeal against constitutional challenge); 17/2546
(upholding limitation on defendant's ability to compel discovery from prosecutor - finding no violation in
reasoning similar to that employed in 16/2541 to justify dismissal); 48/2547 (upholding prosecutorial
discretion in choosing which cases he/she pursues and dismisses); 58/2547 (denying challenge regarding
right of appeal).
237 See, Decision No. 61/2548.
238 Decision No. 11/2544.
239 Decision No. 26/2546.
240 Decision No. 27/2546 and Decision No. 28/2546.
57
In 2003, the Court held that regulating the sale of liquor through the Spirits Act
did not violate the numerous provisions of the Constitution it was claimed to in a
submission to the Court.241 The following year, however, it found that such a
requirement was prohibited by Section 46 of the Constitution (relating to cultural rights)
in the context of a case submitted to it involving a customary alcoholic rice drink.24 2
Possibly motivated by the success of this case, seven more cases were submitted to the
Court challenging the Act under various constitutional provisions. 243 None of these
challenges was successful.
Thus it can be seen that numerous human rights issues have been presented to the
Court and relatively few have been met with a commitment to the protection of individual
rights the Court was hoped to provide. Although many provisions of the Constitution
have relied upon in submissions to the Court, and it has issued decisions regarding many
of them, there remain many which have yet to be interpreted by the Court.244
b) Powers and Procedure
As shown in the chart appended to this paper, the Court has had fifty cases
(roughly one in nine of those which have come before it) submitted to it under Section
266 and has adjudicated a number of those, providing important decisions regarding the
functioning of constitutional organs under the 1997 Constitution. The Court has also
made important decisions related to legislative (and other governmental actors')
procedure, enactments, and powers. Two of these cases dealt with treaty-making. In No.
241 Decision 6/2546.
242 Decision No. 25/2547.
243 Decision Nos. 52-53/2547, 36-39/2548, and 54/2548.
244 Baker & McKenzie, "Time is Ripe to Protect Right to Privacy," Bangkok Post March 17, 2003
("Although the current constitution contains certain provisions assuring rights of Thai citizens to privacy,
there is neither a Thai Supreme Court decision nor a Thai Constitutional Court decision interpreting these
provisions and which may be used as a guideline.")
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11/2542, the Court concluded that correspondence promising repayment of IMF loans did
not constitute a treaty, and thus did not require legislative approval. 245 On the other hand,
the Court held that the Convention on Biological Diversity which would require approval
by the National Assembly.246
In addition to the Court's adjudication regarding powers of constitutional organ, it
has decided twenty-nine cases under Section 295, finding the NCCC's determination to
have been correct in all but one of these. The Court has also approved all seventy-six of
the submissions brought to it by the Political Party Registrar relating to the dissolution of
political parties. Cases falling in these latter two categories have therefore accounted for
well over twenty percent (105 of 447) of the Court's cases in its first eight years. Given
the rubber stamp nature of the Court's adjudication in all but one of these cases, 247 it
might justifiably be doubted that this is the best use of the Court's resources. True, this is
a constitutional issue in that it relates directly to a provision of the Constitution, but it is
really more a procedural or administrative undertaking than an adjudicatory venture.
V. Looking Ahead
The above discussion of the Court's actions during its first eight years provides
evidence that the Court has fulfilled some of the expectations and intended roles
attributed to it from its establishment while less than fully living up to them in other areas.
However, even in these areas, the Court has demonstrated the capability to fulfill the
roles, even if the judicial will is sometimes (even most of the time) lacking.
245 Decision No. 11/2542.
246 Decision No. 33/2543.
247 While dissents are not unheard of in these cases, they are the exception rather than the rule.
Additionally, the only case not to have been rubber-stamped is also generally considered to have been the
most deleterious to the Court's reputation.
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This paper also demonstrates the need for further research into the functioning of
those bodies, including the Court, in pursuance of the goals set out in the Constitution.
Important questions, such as why the Ombudsman has brought so few cases and why the
Administrative Courts have recently started to refer so many, remain to be researched and
answered. The need for more thorough research into the Court's jurisprudence is also
made manifest through the overview provided. For example, following the Court's
jurisprudence chronologically on specific constitutional provisions, as opposed to
thematically, could produce much useful information relative to the Court's success or
failure to uphold the Constitution.
In sum, the Court has yet to fulfill its constitutionally-mandated roles completely,
but its actions demonstrate a vast improvement over the previous systems. More research
is required to explain the shortcomings and to suggest and work through ways of
overcoming them.
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Table 1: Summary of CasesI
Case2 Applicant Authority Section in Type Result
3 Question4
1/2541 Pres of House 219 218 Emergency decrees (ED's) Yes
re economy constitutional?
2/2541 Minister of 266 238 Searches by superior police NA
Interior
3/2541 Election 266 145(3); EC or Civil Court had jur EC
Commission 144(2) over matter re 12 member?
4/2541 Pres of Natl 266 285(5) Did shorter term limits for Yes
Assembly local authorities apply to
those elected prior to
Const?
5/2541 Mrs. Ubon 264 241(4) D can compel discovery in NA
Boonyachalothorn criminal cases? D can
submit to CC? (court has
to)
6/2541 Political Party 328(2)5 328(2) Dissolve Muanchon Party? Yes
Registrar
7/2541 Tambon Tha Kam 266 282;
283(2)
Powers of exec to dissolve
local legislature (term 4/5)
NA
1 Cases of the Constitutional Court of the Kingdom of Thailand from 1998-2005. The information on the table is
taken from summaries and decisions as posted on the Court's website (http://www.concourt.or.thl). For the years
2004-2005, the cases are only available in Thai, and even this limited availability is not complete for these two years,
but summaries or decisions are available online for the vast majority of the cases for these years and are thus
included for consideration in this chart.
2 The citations indicate the number of the decision of the Court for the given year. Years are according to the Thai
Calendar (543 years ahead of the Christian calendar).
3 The section of the 1997 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand under which the Court derives its authority or
jurisdiction for the particular case or under which such authority is claimed by petitioner.
4 This refers to the section of the Constitution for which an interpretation is being sought.
5 Cases listed in this chart as arising under Section 328 actually arise under the Organic Law of the Political Parties
Act, sec. 65(2) made pursuant to Section 323 and in accordance with Section 328.
8/2541 Satun Provincial 264 70(3); 4- Due Process NA
Court6  6, 26-28,
30, 48?
9/2541 Suphan Buri 264 145(3), Law re qualifications of Yes
Provincial Court 144(2) candidates const?
10/2541 Tambon Tha Kam 2667 285(5) interp "members of a local NA
assembly" (term 4/5)
11/2541 Nonthaburi 264 233 Number of signatures for Dsmd
Provincial Court SC quorum; Lease of Land
Act Const?
12/2541 Civil Court 264 26, 27, 29 5(1) of Act on Negligence Yes
Liabilities of Officials
Const?
13- Presidents of 262 Enactment of Cooperatives No




15/2541 Election 266 68 EC has power to specify No
Commission penalties for failure to
vote?
16/2541 Supreme Court 264 272, 26- 220 of Crim Pro Code Yes
28 Const (rt to appeal)?
1/2542 12 Reps 47(3,4) 118(8) Can party oust elected No
(Prachakorn Thai members from House?
Party)
2/2542 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Patiroop Party? Yes
Registrar
3/2542 Pres of House 262(1)(1) 224 Enactment of Bankruptcy Yes
Bill Const? (IMF compel?)
4/2542 Songkhla
Provincial Court
264 264 Interest rates notification
const?
Dsmd
6 See http://www.judiciary.go.th/eng/thejudiciary.htm#t6 for an explanation of the structure of the Thai
Courts of Justice.
7 Neither the summary nor the full text of the decision available online mention the specific article under
which the case was brought, and it is not clear from either which article would have given jurisdiction to
the Court. However, the Court found the question asked addressed the same issue as 4/2541. Also, the
case was brought by a municipality (a "tambon" in this instance), similar to 7/2541 (which was also not
accepted for consideration). Thus, article 266 seems the most likely possibility.
5/2542 Bangkok South 264 30 Bank of Thailand notices Dsmd
Civil Court law? (No); Disc? (No)
6/2542 EC 266 145(1)(2) scope of EC's powers Dsmd
145(1)(6) (what and when) over other
144(1) govt organs
7/2542 EC 266 68(3), Voting rights of an eligible Dsmd
105(2) voter
8/2542 EC 266 315 Qualifications in transition Dsmd
9/2542 Lom Sak 264 30 Notification violated Act? Dsmd
Provincial Court (Not a const. Q); other
notification not law
(4/2542)
10/2542 Civil Court 264 30 Bank of Thailand Dsmd
Notifications
11/2542 Pres of Natl 266 224 Letters of intent to IMF = No
Assembly treaty?
12- Lom Sak 264 30 Bank of Thailand Dsmd
35/2542 Provincial Court Notifications
36/2542 Pres of House 266 216(4) Suspended sentence of No
imprisonment sufficient to
terminate ministership?
37/2542 Pres of Senate 262(2) 30, 45, 86 Const? 39 of Organic Bill Yes
on Parliamentary
Ombudsman (exempting
that office from labor
regulations and laws)
38- Bangkok South 264 30? Bank of Thailand Dsmd
40/2542 Civil Court; Notifications
Suphan Buri
Provincial Court
41/2542 Bangkok South 264 57 Kasikorn Thai Bank Dsmd
Civil Court Notification




264 29, 38 Sukhapibal Act const?
(Dqed for office by
becoming a monk is ok)
Yes
45/2542 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Maharadthipat Yes
Registrar Party?
46/2542 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Chivit Mai Party? Yes
Registrar
47/2542 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Chatniyom Party? Yes
Registrar
48/2542 Pres of Senate 262(1) 42, 48, 50 Rubber Control Bill (state Yes
control over rubber) const?
49/2542 Pres of House 96 315(2), Membership of Rep dqed Yes
323 on lower academic quals?
50/2542 Pres of House 262(1) 30, 87 State Enterprise Yes
Corporatisation Bill const?
51- Pres of Natl 266 315 EC's resolution on quals of No
52/2542 Assembly sen/house candidates ok?
53/2542 Senate 266 125, 315 Quals for senate candidacy Yes
have to meet new const (as
EC says)?
54/2542 Pres of Natl 266 277 PM's submission of list Yes
Assembly w/o prior approval of
senate ok?
1/2543 Bangkok South 264 4, 5, 26- 16 and 120 of Crim Pro Yes
Criminal Court 28, 30- Code Const? Human
33, 70, dignity (bring it up in ct of
241, 243 justice)
2/2543 Criminal Court 264 4, 5, 26- 16 and 120 of Crim Pro Dsmd
28, 30- Code Const? Human
33, 70, dignity (bring it up in ct of
241, 243 justice)
3/2543 Political Party's 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Chat Samakkee Yes
Registrar Party?
4/2543 Political Party's 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Thai Kaona Yes
Registrar Party? "180 days" = 6
mos? (No)
5/2543 Pres of Natl
Assembly







6/2543 EC 266 68 Royalty have to vote? No
7/2543 Civil Court 264 57, 60 Commercial Banking Act Yes
(giving Bank of Thailand
power on interest and
discounts w/o participation
of the people) const?
8/2543 Songkhla 264 57 Request by ind for interp of Dsmd
Provincial Court 57 (as opposed to claim of
unconstitutionality)
9/2543 Songkla Provincial 264 50, 57 Bank of Thailand's acts Dsmd
Court proper?
10/2543 NCCC 295 292 Failure to submit asset info Yes
- duty and intentional
breach?
11/2543 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to Yes
provide asset, or gave false
info?
12/2543 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to Yes
provide asset, or gave false
info?
13/2543 EC 266 Powers/duties of EC and Yes
Courts of Justice - ct's
preventing of withdrawal
of candidacy bec late ok?
14- Phra Nakhon Si 264 30, 50, 60 PM's order re shrimp Dsmd
15/2543 Ayutthaya farming const?
Provincial Court
16- Suphan Buri 264 30, 50, 60 ditto (PM not organ Dsmd
19/2543 Provincial Court exercising legislative
power)
20/2543 Pres of Natl 266 131, 168, Powers/duties Senate - Yes;
Assembly 121, 315 need 200 to perform No
duties? can old fill in till
new come?




22/2543 Pres of Senate 262 209 partnerships/shares bill Yes
(allowing "by law"
ministers to maintain more
shares than Const allows by
transferring to a juristic
person) const?
23/2543 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to Yes
provide asset, or gave false
info?
24/2543 Ombudsman 198 29, 124- EC's dq of candidate No
126 resulting from multiple
elections const?
25/2543 Lampang 264 Similar to 24/2543, but Dsmd
Provincial Court referred by court on diff
grounds - EC's reg (not a
body exercising leg power)
26/2543 Council of 266 159, 90 Can Council of Ministers Yes,
Ministers open Natl Assembly w/o moot,
200 senators? If not, when yes
is first sitting to be? Can
House sit, regardless?
27/2543 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to Yes
provide asset, or gave false
info?
28/2543 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to Yes
provide asset, or gave false
info?
29/2543 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Dharmarat Party? Yes
Registrar
30/2543 Founder Numchai 1928 33? Political party registrar's Yes
Party refusal to recognize party
const?
31/2543 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to
provide asset, or gave false
info?
Yes
8Actually, the provision granting jurisdiction is found in the enacting legislation (Organic Act on Policital
Parties, B.E. 2541 (1998)) made pursuant to this article.
32/2543 Pres of Natl 266 180 Extraordinary Committee No
Assembly could add to Annual
Appropriation Bill?
33/2543 Council of 266 224 Convention on Biological Yes
Ministers Diversity a treaty requiring
Natl Assembly approval?
34- Taling Chan 264 30 286 of civ pro code Yes
53/2543 District Court; (granting cts discretion in
Thon Buri Civil exempting moneys from
Court legal executions) const?
54- Pres of Senate 262 3, 29, 30, bill on elections (giving EC Yes
55/2543 233, 234, power to revoke candidacy
271 rts for dishonesty and annul
bad party votes) const?
56/2543 Pres of House 262 29, 30, 32 bill on elections (requiring Yes
reps from constituency
elections appointed PM had
to pay for election of
replacement) const?
57/2543 Member of House 118 47 Membership in House Dsmd
terminated by party const?
(Already terminated by
royal decree - moot)
58- Leaders for 266 78, 87, Act on Provincial Admin NA
62/2543 tambons 88, 282, Org (empowering province
Kantararom, Koh 283, 284 to tax oil and tobacco





63/2543 NCCC 266 Powers/duties relating to NA
finance bills and PM and
Minister of Finance
64/2543 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Ruk Chat Party? Yes
Registrar




328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Thai Pattana
Party?
Yes
3/2544 Chon Buri 264 4, 30, 33 laws/regs allowing prisoner Dsmd
Provincial Court to be kept in ankle chains (moot)
for 2 years, 4 mos const?
4/2544 Pres of Senate 96 208, 215, Did 10 ministers' holdings No
216 or positions in companies
violate 208 of the Const?
5/2544 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to Yes
provide asset, or gave false
info?
6/2544 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Pracharath Party? Yes
Registrar
7/2544 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Naewruam Yes
Registrar Kasertrakorn Party?
8/2544 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Phalang Yes
Registrar Samakkee Party?
9- Bangkok South 264 29 ED and Notification re Yes
10/2544 Civil Court; Civil banking const? (notice
Court outside court's powers)
11/2544 Supreme Court 264 33 15 of narcotics act Yes
(assuming intent to
distribute where possess a
lot) const?
12/2544 Ombudsman 198 133 termination of membership Yes
of senator/rep upon EC's
order for new election
const?
13/2544 Pres of Natl 266 133 EC's order of new elections Yes,
Assembly const? Order for new Yes
elections w/o revoking
election rights const?
14/2544 Supreme Court 264 29,48 Bankruptcy Act, allowing Yes
ct-appointed receiver to
dispose of assets, const?
15/2544 Court of Appeal
for Region 3
264 29 Bankruptcy Act, allowing
ct-appointed receiver to
dispose of assets, const?
Dsmd
16/2544 Bangkok South 264 35, 48, 50 ED (giving merged co Dsmd,
Civil Court rights in extant suit and Yes
chance to give ev)
consistent w/ Civil Code?
Constitution?
17/2544 Phrae Provincial 264 285 Election law (applicant Dsmd
Court died)
18/2544 Pres of Senate 266 258 NCCC members No
acting as Pres of partnership interests and
Natl Assembly actions violated 258?
19/2544 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to Yes
provide asset, or gave false
info?
20/2544 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to No,
provide asset, or gave false Dsmd
info (Thaksin's Case)?
21/2544 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Thai Samakkee Yes
Registrar Party?
22/2544 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Chat Kasertrakorn Yes
Registrar Party?
23/2544 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Ruk Samakkee Yes
Registrar Party?
24/2544 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Raam Siam Yes
Registrar Party?
25/2544 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Sangkom Yes
Registrar Prachachon Party?
26/2544 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Phituk Thai Yes
Registrar Party?
27/2544 Suphan Buri 264 50 Bd of Sugar regs/notices Dsmd
Provincial Court ("laws" for purposes of
264) const?
28/2544 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Seree Dharma Yes
Registrar Party (to amalgamate)?




328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Sattha Prachachon
Party?
Yes
31/2544 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Phalang Yes
Registrar Kasertrakorn Thai Party?
32/2544 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Niti Mahachon Yes
Registrar Party?
33/2544 Ombudsman 198 235, 276 ED allowing cts to appoint Yes
absolute receivers const?
34/2544 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Prachachon Yes
Registrar Party?
35- Central 264 26, 29, Bankruptcy Act, allowing Yes
36/2544 Bankruptcy Court 30, 48, creditors valued at more
252, than 50% (???)to accept a
335(1) business rehab plan const?
37- Central 264 29, 30, 48 Bankruptcy Act Dsmd
39/2544 Bankruptcy Court discriminatory? (like 35-
36/2544)
40- Bangkok South 264 26, 29, ED's relating to finance Dsmd




50/2544 Central Tax Court 264 30 legislation tax court to Yes;
make its rules const? Reg No
re discovery/witness lists
law under 264?
1/2545 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Thin Thai Party? Yes
Registrar
2/2545 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Ekhapharb Party? Yes
Registrar
3-4/2545 Senate, Pres of 266, 262 90, 92, House's res disagreeing No
Senate 175 w/joint committee's





328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Sangkom Thai
Party
Yes
6/2545 Supreme Court 264 49 21 of Act on Expropriation Yes
of Immovable Property (on
compensation for takings)
const?
7/2545 Bangkok South 264 57 Lack of public participation Yes
Civil Court in Bank of Thailand
decisions/policies const?
8/2545 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Sangkhom Mai Yes
Registrar Party?
9/2545 Thonburi Civil 264 26-30 ED on Finance (allowing Yes
Court mergers) const? (4/2542)
10/2545 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Phalang Thai Yes
Registrar Party?
11/2545 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Chaona Phattana Yes
Registrar Pratet Party?
12/2545 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Kwamwangmai Yes
Registrar Party? (to merge)
13/2545 Thon Buri Civil 264 4, 5, 26- Provisions of Commercial Yes
Court 29, 50, 57 Banking Act (allegedly
favorable to banks) const?
14/2545 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to Yes
submit asset info?
15/2545 Pres of Natl 266 ? Procedure for removal of NA
Assembly CC judges (related to
Thaksin's case)
16/2545 Ombudsman 198 30 26(10) of Rules on Judicial Yes
Officials of courts of
justice (dqing from taking
judge exam for phys)
const?
17/2545 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to Yes
submit account info? (Also
on when 5-yr prohibition
starts)
18/2545 I1NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to
submit asset info?
Yes





23/2545 Lampang 264 29 ED on finance const? Yes
Provincial Court
24/2545 Min Buri 264 4, 26, 27, ED on finance const? Yes
Provincial Court 29, 30, (Necessity, not to essence
48, 50 of rights; provisions of law)
25/2545 Bangkok South 264 4, 26, 27, ED on finance const? Dsmd
Civil Court 29, 30, (Necessity, not to essence
48, 50 of rights; provisions of law)
26- Bangkok South 264 26, 29, 48 ED on finance const? Dsmd
34/2545 Civil Court, Civil (Necessity, not to essence
Court of rights; provisions of law)
35/2545 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to Yes
submit asset info?
36/2545 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Palang Mai Party? Yes
Registrar
37/2545 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to or Yes
submitted false asset info?
38/2545 Pres Natl 266 138 Powers and duties of EC: No
Assembly procedure followed by
selective committee const?
39/2545 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to or Yes
(interesti submitted false asset info?
ng split)
40/2545 Thon Buri Civil 264 4, 26, 27, ED on Asset Mgmt Corp Yes
Court 29, 30, (assigning of claim rights
48, 50 to ASM) const?
41/2545 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to or Yes
submitted false asset info?




328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Phattana Thai
Party?
Yes
44/2545 Central Admin 264 29, 30 State Atty Rules (excluding Yes
Court people w/ phys deformities
can't test) const?
45/2545 Thon Buri Civil 264 30, 50, Com. Bkg Act (giving Yes
Court 57, 87 Bank of Thailand power to
set interest ratesconst?
(Mostly estopped)
46/2545 Civil Court 264 87, 92, ED re Com Bkg Act const Dsmd
218 (procedure - bypassing natl
assbly) const?
47/2545 Thon Buri Civil 264 30, 50, Sec. 30 of finance act Yes
Court 57, 87 const?
48/2545 Central Tax Court 264 29, 30, 80 Sections of Tax Code const Yes
(disc against marrieds)?
49/2545 Bangkok South 264 29, 30 Com Bkg Act and Finance Yes
Civil Court Act (rights in suit) const?
50/2545 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Saangsan Thai Yes
Registrar Party?
51/2545 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Thai Ruam Yes
Registrar Phalang Party?
52/2545 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Witee Thai Party? Yes
Registrar
53/2545 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to or Yes
submitted false asset info?
54/2545 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Kasert Seree Yes
Registrar Party?
55/2545 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Num Thai Party? Yes
Registrar
56/2545 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Chat Prachachon Yes
Registrar Party?
57/2545 Bangkok South 264 29, 30 ED's re finance const? Yes
Civil Court
58/2545 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to or Yes
submitted false asset info?
59/2545 Pres of Senate 262 29, 48,
46, 56
Ores Bill (mining rights
under owned land, and
envirmtl impact) const?
Yes
60/2545 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Seree Thai Party? Yes
Registrar
61/2545 Civil Court 264 29, 50 ED re finance const? Yes
62/2545 Criminal Court 264 35, 44, 46 Petroleum Authority Act Yes
(oil protestors) const?
63/2545 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Thai Maharat Yes
Registrar Party?
64/2545 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Thai Yes
Registrar Thammathippati Party?
1/2546 Central Admin 264 282, 283, Changwat admin rules Yes
Court 284 (giving changwat
overlapping power to
collect taxes and fees
denied self-determination?)
const?




3/2546 Central Labour 264 4, 26, 29, Social Insurance Act (app Yes
Court 30 for birthing benefits time
barred) const?
4/2546 Civil Court 264 7, 29, ED re finance const? Yes
233, 271
5/2546 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Sangkom Yes
Registrar Prachathippatai Party?
6/2546 Lampun 264 46, 50, Spirits Act (requiring Yes
Provincial Court 76, 78, 84 license for distillation of
spirits) const?
7/2546 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to or Yes
submitted false asset info?
8- Bangkok South 264 29 ED re finance and Com Yes
11/2546 Civil Court Bkg Act const?
12/2546 Palang Dhamma
Party Leader




13/2546 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Thai Mahachon Yes
Registrar Party?
14/2546 Pres of House 219 218(1) ED on excise taxes met Yes
procedural reqs (6 judges
against, but would need 2/3
according to 219(4))?
15/2546 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Kae Punha Chat Yes
Registrar Party?
16/2546 Buriram 264 233 Section 175 of Crim Pro Dsmd
Provincial Court Code (re production of ev
by prosecution to ct) const?
17/2546 Chachengsao 264 241 175 of Crim Pro Code Yes
Provincial Court const?
18/2546 Ombudsman 266 197 Selective Committee of EC NA
person?
19/2546 Ombudsman 266 197, 198 Sel Com. for judges of CC NA
person?
20/2546 Ombudsman 266 197 Ombudsman has discretion Yes
to determine if provisions
under 197 present const q?
21/2546 Ombudsman 198 30 Names Act (requiring No
women to take husband's
names on marriage) const
22/2546 Nonthaburi 264 30 ED on Asset Mgmt const? Yes
Provincial Court
23/2546 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Suntipab Party? Yes
Registrar
24/2546 Ombudsman 198 236 Military Courts Act No
(allowing provincial mil ct
to try case but not pass
jdgmt) const?
25/2546 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Phalang Yes
Registrar Mahachon Party?
26/2546 Supreme Court 264 64 Act re drugs (harsher
penalties for govt officials)
const?
Yes
27/2546 Supreme Court 264 26, 30, Drugs act (allowing taking Yes
33,48 of drug $ pending trial)
const?
28/2546 Criminal Court 264 33,48 Drugs act (taking $) const? Yes
29/2546 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to or Yes
submitted false asset info?
30/2546 Thonburi Civil 264 29,30 ED re bkg and finance Yes
Court const?
31/2546 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to or Yes
submitted false asset info?
32/2546 House 180(7) 180(6) Manner of appropriations Yes
const?
33/2546 NCCC 266 293 Act requiring NCCC to Dsmd
disclose financial reports of
people other than PM and
Ministers const?
34/2546 Civil Court 264 30 Bankruptcy Act const? Yes
35/2546 Central IP and Intl 264 30 Bankruptcy Act const? Yes
Trade Court
36/2546 Central IP and Intl 264 30 Bankruptcy Act const Dsmd
Trade Court (provision of law)?
37/2546 Ombudsman 198 30 Nationality Act (providing Yes
procedure foreign women
who marry Thai men get
nationality but not vice-
versa) const?
38/2546 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Sangkom Pattana Yes
Registrar Party?
39/2546 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Thai SereeParty? Yes
Registrar
40- Civil Court 264 29, 32, Money laundering Act Yes
41/2546 48, 235 (taking $ = crim or civil (civil)
property matter?) const?




266 159(4) Senate motion to establish
21 committees const
NA
44/2546 Pres Natl 266 257, 261 committee to select choices Yes
Assembly for CC (duties of overlap
w/ Senate) done const?
45/2546 Ombudsman 198 30 Election law (holding Thai No
nationals w/ foreign dad to
higher standard) const?
46/2546 Chivit Ti Di Kwa 192 political party registrar's Yes




47/2546 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to or Yes
submitted false asset info?
48/2546 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to or Yes
submitted false asset info?
49/2546 Ubon Ratchathani 264 32 Parties act (criminalizing Yes
Provincial Court failing to file financial
reports) const?
50/2546 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Amnaj Yes
Registrar Prachachon Party?
51/2546 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Kasettrakorn Yes
Registrar Party?
52/2546 Election 266 145(1)(3) Can EC be subject to legal No
Commission proceedings in admin ct?
1- Central Admin 264 276 enacting provisions re Yes




25/2547 Supreme Admin 264 46, 50 Act req'g permit to sell No
Court [alcoholic rice drink?]
const?
26/2547 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Seritham party? Yes
Registrar
27/2547 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to or
submitted false asset info?
Yes
28/2547 Central Admin 264 29, 50 Act req'g expiration for Yes
Court nursing licenses where
none had existed before
const?
29- Pres of Senate and 219 218(1) procedure enacting ED's re Yes
30/2547 Pres of House crim law and money
(justifiable on the grounds
listed in 218?) const?
31/2547 Pres of the Natl 266 Can Senate recall a bill Yes
Assembly submitted to PM before
King signs it due to internal
inconsistencies?
32- Songkhla 264 248, 276 Act re elections of local Dsmd
34/2547 Provincial Court; authorities - which courts
Pattani Provincial have auth over cases?
Court
35/2547 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to or Yes
submitted false asset info?
36/2547 NCCC 266 304-306 NCCC req'd to verify Yes
petition (and names) before
investigating CC judges?
37/2547 Civil Court 264 29 ED on asset mgmt const? Yes
38- Central 264 6, 27-30, ED on asset mgmt const? Yes
39/2547 Bankruptcy Court 57
40/2547 Nakhon Pathom 264 29 ED on asset mgmt const? Yes
Provincial Court
41/2547 Supreme Court 264 4, 5, 7, reg re tax (stamp) Yes
26-30, exemption for govt const?
48, 60,
75,233
42/2547 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Thai Yes
Registrar Prachatipatay Party?
43/2547 Nakhon 264 50 ED re bkg and finance Yes
Rachasima const?
Provincial Court
44/2547 Pres of Natl
Assembly
266 256 re powers/procedure of
selection committee
NA
45- Central Admin 264 26, 27, Act re electricity (allowing Yes
46/2547 Court 48,49 takings for running electric
lines) const?
47/2547 Pres of Natl 266 312, 333 State Audit Commission No
Assembly followed const procedure
in nominating persons for
post of State Auditor
General?
48/2547 Bangkok Military 264 26 Crim Pro Code (discretion Yes
Court of prosecutor) const?
49/2547 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Kased Kaw Na Yes
Registrar Party?
50/2547 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to or Yes
submitted false asset info?
51/2547 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to or Yes
submitted false asset info?
52- Ubon Ratchatani 264 6, 27, 32, Act req'g permit to sell Yes
53/2547 District Court 46, 48, alcohol const (re other than
50, 83, 87 alcoholic rice drink -
25/2547)?
54/2547 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Phalang Seritham Yes
Registrar Party?
55/2547 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Kaw Na Party? Yes
Registrar
56/2547 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Thai Phithak Thai Yes
Registrar Party?
57/2547 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Chat Phathana Yes
Registrar Party (to merge w/ Thai
Ruk Thai?
58/2547 Supreme Court 264 26-30, 221 Code of Crim Pro (re rt Yes
233 to appeal) const?
59/2547 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Chaw Thai Na Yes
Registrar Party?




328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Reng Ngaan Thai
Party?
Yes
62/2547 NCCC 295 292 Intentionally failed to or Yes
submitted false asset info?
63/2547 NCCC 266 300-302 budget/expense q's NA
64/2547 Ombudsman 198 29, 48, 50 ED on bankruptcy (giving Yes
debtors priority in choosing
bankruptcy planners)
const?
65- Supreme Admin 264 4, 6, 27, leg estab'g admin courts Yes
82/2547 Court 29, 62 and procedures (default/stat
of limitations) const?
83/2547 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Seri Yes
Registrar Prachathipatay Party?
84/2547 Supreme Admin 264 26, 30 leg estab'g admin courts Yes
Court and procedures (court fees
req'd even of indigents)
const?
1/2548 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Ruam Thai Party? Yes
Registrar
2/2548 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Chat Prachachon Yes
Registrar Party?
3/2548 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Ton Trakun Thai Yes
Registrar Party (to merge w/Chat
Thai Party)?
4/2548 Supreme Admin 264 1-3, 6, Provinces exceeded power No
Court 28, 29, 50 in punishing failure to pay
service and admin
taxes/fees on hotels by fine
and/or jail?
5- Supreme Admin 264 6, 29, 48 leg estab'g admin courts Yes
26/2548 Court and procedures (default/stat
of limits - 65-82/2547)
const?
27- Supreme Admin 264 6, 29, 48, leg estab'g admin courts Yes
28/2548 Court 75 and procedures (default/stat




266 defining powers NA
30/2548 Pres of Senate 262(1) 29, 32, 48 38(1) of act re mnfctrg No;
CD's (taking machinery of Yes
those who don't comply)
const? If not, is it
severable?




32/2548 Ombudsman 198 40, 50, ED re taxes (exemptions Yes
335 for telecom) const?
33/2548 Central Labour 264 29, 30 120 of labour act (re Yes
Court moving operations/notice
to employees) const?
34/2548 Civil Court 264 3, 30 Code of civ and commerce Yes;
const? Code of Civ Pro NA
const?
35/2548 Court of Appeal 264 231 Political parties act (re regs Yes
for Region 4 on parties and admin)
const?
36/2548 Nakhon Si 264 46, 50, 17 of alcohol act (req'g Yes
Ayutthaya District 84, 87 permit to sell alcohol)
Court const?
37/2548 Court of Appeal 264 46, 83, 87 5, 25 of alcohol act (52- Yes
for Region 3 53/2547; re making and
means to make it) const?
38/2548 Nakhon 264 46, 50, 5 of alcohol act const? Yes
Rachasima District 76, 78,
Court 83-84, 87
39/2548 Nakhon 264 46, 50, 5 of alcohol act const? Yes
Rachasima District 76, 78,
Court 83-84, 87
40/2548 Central IP and Intl 264 4, 29, 30, 90/27 and 90/60 of Yes
Trade Court 48 Bankruptcy Act (re debtors
and their insurers) const?




42/2548 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Prachatham Yes
Registrar Party?
43/2548 Central Admin 264 276 3 of act est admin courts Yes;
Court and procedures const (1- NA
24/2547)? Council of
Ministers competent here?
44/2548 Central Admin 264 276 3, 9, 42 of act est admin Yes
Court courts and procedures const
(1-24/2547)?
45/2548 Supreme Court 264 27, 29 9 of act re prosecuting govt Yes
officials const?
46/2548 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Phathana Yes
Registrar_ Sangkhom Thai Party?
47/2548 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Reng Ngan Party? Yes
Registrar
48/2548 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Chat Phathana Yes
Registrar Party?
49- Prachuab 264 4, 27-30, ED on asset mgmt and Yes
50/2548 Khirikhan 48 code of civ pro const?
Provincial Court
51/2548 Central Admin 264 48, 49 29 and 30 of Thai Yes
Court petroleum act (natural
resources for good of the
people) const?
52/2548 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Chat Yes
Registrar Prachathipatay Party?
53/2548 Bangkok South 264 26, 27, 30 30 of ED re finance const? Yes
Civil Court (61/2545)
54/2548 Lamphun 264 26-29, 5 (making) and 32 Yes
Provincial Court 42, 46, 50 (punishing
consumption/possession) of
alcohol act const?
55/2548 Central Admin 264 ministerial decree (ordering Dsmd
Court taking) const?
56/2548 Criminal Court 264 6, 40, 335 11 of the ministerial law
(27/2544) and act re TV
and radio (crim provisions;
permit reqs) const?
Yes
57/2548 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Thang Luag Thi Yes
Registrar Saam Party?
58/2548 Supreme Admin 264 29 49 act est admin courts and Yes
Court procedures const?
59/2548 Political Party 328(2) 328(2) Dissolve Prachachon Yes
Registrar Party?
60/2548 State Audit 266 Q re 47/2547 NA
Commission
61/2548 Supreme Court 264 30 229 of the Code of Civ Pro Yes
(court fees) const?
62/2548 Supreme Admin 264 29, 62, 42 and 49 act est admin Yes
Court 276 courts and procedures
const?
63/2548 Court of Appeals 264 4, 26, 29, 8 and 10 of ED re fraud Yes
30, 33, 48 const?
Table 2: Sections Under Which Cases Have Come Before the Court
Section Granting # Cases (years - case numbers)
Jurisdiction
Section 264 Cases 257 2541 -5, 8,9, 11, 12, 16
2542 - 4,5,9,10, 12-35,38-44
2543 - 1, 2,7-9, 14-19, 25,34-53
2544 - 3, 9-11, 14-17, 27, 35-50
2545 - 6, 7, 9, 13, 19-34, 40, 44-49, 57, 61, 62
2546 - 1, 3, 4,6,8-11, 16,17, 22, 26-28,30,34-36, 40,41,49
2547 - 1-25, 28, 32-34, 37-41, 43, 45, 46, 48, 52, 53, 58, 65-
82, 84
2548 - 4-28, 33-41, 43-45, 49-51, 53-56, 58, 61-63
Section 328 Cases 76 2541 - 6
2542 -2, 45-47
2543 -3,4,29, 64
2544 - 1, 2, 6-8, 21-26, 28-32, 34
2545 - 1, 2, 5, 8, 10-12, 36, 42, 43, 50-52, 54-56, 60, 63, 64
2546 - 5,13,15,23, 25, 38, 39, 42, 50,51
2547 - 26,42, 49, 54-57, 59-61, 83
2548 - 1-3, 42,46-48, 52, 57, 59
Section 266 Cases 50 2541 - 2-4, 7, 10, 15
2542- 6-8,11,36,51-54
2543 - 5,6,13,20, 21,26, 32, 33,58-63
2544 - 13, 18
2545 -3,15,38
2546 - 2, 18-20, 33, 43, 44, 52
2547 - 31,36,44,47,63
2548 - 29, 31, 60
Section 295 Cases 29 2543 - 10-12, 23, 31, 37, 38
2544 - 5,19, 20
2545 -14, 17, 18, 35, 37, 39, 41, 53, 58
2546-7,29,31,47,48
2547 - 27, 35, 50, 51, 62
Section 262 Cases 13 2541 - 13, 14
2542 - 3, 37, 48, 50
2543 - 22, 54-56
2545 - 4, 59
2548 - 30
Section 198 Cases 10 2543 - 24





Section 219 Cases 4 2541 - 1
2546 - 14, 29, 30
Section 192 Cases 3 2543 - 30
2546- 12,46
Section 96 Cases 2 2542 -49
2544 - 4
Section 47 Cases 1 2542 - 1
Section118 Cases 1 2543 - 118
Section 180 Cases 1 2546 - 32
Table 3: Who Has Brought Cases Before the Court
Petitioner # Cases (years - case numbers)
House of 12 2541-1,14
Representativesg 2542 - 3, 36, 49, 50




Political Party 76 2541 -6
Registrar 2542 - 2,45-47
2543 - 3, 4, 29, 64
2544 - 1, 2, 6-8, 21-26, 28-32, 34
2545 -1, 2, 5, 8,10-12, 36,42,43, 50-52,54-56,60,63, 64
2546 - 5, 13, 15, 23, 25, 38, 39, 42, 50, 51
2547 - 26,42,49,54-57, 59-61,83
2548 - 1-3, 42, 46-48, 52, 57, 59
Senate9  14 2541-13
2542 - 37,48,53





NCCC 34 2543 -10-12, 23, 31,37, 38,63
2544 - 5, 19,20
2545 -14, 17, 18,35, 37, 39, 41,53,58
2546-2,7,29,31,33,47,48
2547 -27,35,36, 50, 51,62,63
National Assemblylo 17 2541-4
2542 - 11, 51, 52, 54
2543 -5,20,32
2544 - 13, 18"
2545 -15, 38
2546 - 43, 44
| j12547 - 31, 44, 47
8 This number is inclusive of cases brought on behalf of the House by its president and cases brought by its
members.
9 This number is inclusive of cases brought on behalf of the Senate by its president and cases brought by its
members.
10 This number is inclusive of cases brought on behalf of the National Assembly by its president and cases
brought by its members.
" The President of the Senate was acting as the President of the National Assembly since it had not yet
been constituted due to irregularities in the then recent House elections.
Ombudsman 13 2543 - 24
2544 - 2, 33
2545-16
2546 - 18-21, 24, 37,45
2547 - 64
2548 - 32




Provinces and 7 2541 -7 (Tha Kam), 10 (Tha Kam)
Tambons12  2543 - 58 (Kantararom), 59 (Chiang Mai), 60 (Koh Pangun),
61 (Bantai), 62 (Koh Pangun)
Party Representatives 4 2542 - 1
or Leaders 2543 -30
2546 -12, 46
Courts 13  256 2541- 8, 9,11,12,16
2542 - 4, 5, 9, 10, 12-35, 38-44
2543 -1, 2, 7-9,14-19, 25,34-53
2544 - 3, 9-11, 14-17, 27, 35-50
2545 - 6, 7, 9, 13, 19-34, 40, 44-49, 57, 61, 62
2546-1, 3, 4, 6, 8-11,16,17, 22, 26-28, 30, 34-36, 40, 41, 49
2547 - 1-25, 28, 32-34, 37-41, 43, 45, 46, 48, 52, 53, 58, 65-
82, 84
2548 - 4-28,33-41, 43-45,49-51, 53-56, 58, 61-63
Individuals 1 2541 -5 (Mrs. Ubon Boonyachalothon)
Council of Ministers 4 2541-214
2543 - 26, 33
2548 - 29
State Audit 1 2548 -60
Commission
12 This number is inclusive of cases brought by mayors and representatives of administrative organizations.
13 These are further broken down in the chart immediately following this one.
14 This case was actually brought by the Minister of Interior and was dismissed because it was brought by a
part of the Council, a constitutional organ, not by the actual constitutional organ.
Table 4: Breakdown of Referrals to the Constitutional Court by Other Courts
4(A) Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal (14)
Court # Cases (years - case numbers)
Supreme Court 10 2541-16
2544- 11,14
2545 - 6
2546 - 26, 27
2547 - 41, 58
2548 - 48, 61
Court of Appeal 1 2548 - 63
Court of Appeal 2 2544-15
(Region 3) 2548 - 37
Court of Appeal 1 2548 - 35
(Region 4)
4(B) Provincial Courts (61)
Lom Sak 25 2542 - 9,12-35




Songkhla 5 2542 - 4
2543 - 8, 9
2547 - 32, 33
Nonthaburi 2 2541-11
2546 - 22
Phra Nakhon Si 2 2543 -14, 15
Ayutthaya
Sikhio 2 2542 - 42,43
Lampang 2 2543 - 25
2545 - 23
Prachuab Khiri Khan 2 2548 - 49, 50
Lampun 2 2546 - 6
2548 - 54
Samut Sakhon 1 2544 - 49
Patum Thani 1 2545 - 19
Min Buri 1 2545 - 24
Buriram 1 2546 - 16
Chachengsao 1 2546 - 17
Ubon Rachathani 1 2546 - 49
Pattani 1 2547 - 34
Nakhon Patom 1 2547 - 40
Nakhon Rachasima 1 2547 - 43
Satun 1 2541-8
Chon Buri 1 2544 -3
Phrae 1 2544 -17
4(C) District Courts (8)
Nakhon Rachasima 2 2548 - 38, 39
Ubon Rachathani 2 2547 - 52, 53
Nakhon Si Ayutthaya 1 2548 - 36
Dusit 1 2545 - 20
Taling Chan 1 2543 - 34
Nakhon Sawan 1 2542 - 44
4(D) Civil Courts (72)








Bangkok South Civil 30 2542 -5, 38, 39,41
Court 2544 - 9, 16,40-47,
2545 -7, 21, 22, 25-30, 49, 57
2546 - 8-11
2548 - 53
Thonburi Civil Court 25 2543 - 35-53,
2545 -9,13,40,45,47
2546 - 30
4(E) Administrative Courts (80)
Supreme 47 2547 - 25, 65-82, 84
2548 - 4-28, 58, 62
Central 30 2545 - 45
2546 - 1
2547 -1-18, 21, 22, 24, 28, 45,46
2548 -43,44,51,55
Nakhon Rachasima 2 2547 - 19,23
Songkhla 1 2547 - 20
4(F) Specialty and Other Courts (21)
Central Bankruptcy 7 2544 - 35-39
Court 2547 - 38, 39




Central Tax Court 3 2544 - 50
2545 - 48
2548 - 41
Central Intellectual 3 2546 - 35, 36
Property and 2548 - 40
International Trade
Court
Central Labor Court 2 2546 -3
2548 - 33
Bangkok Military 1 2547 -48
Court
'5 This case was actually referred by the Bangkok South Criminal Court.

